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Abstract: Since the global financial crisis in 2008, corporations have faced a crisis of 
trust, with growing sentiment against ‘elites and ‘big business’ and a feeling that 
‘something ought to be done’ to re-establish public regard for corporations. Trust and 
trustworthiness are deeply moral significant. They provide the ‘glue or lubricant’ that 
begets reciprocity, decreases risk, secures dignity and respect, and safeguards against 
the subordination of the powerless to the powerful. However, in deciding how to 
restore trust, it is difficult to determine precisely what should be done, by whom, and 
who will bear the cost, especially if  any action involves a risk to overall market effi-
ciency and corporate profitability.
The paper explores whether corporations have a moral duty to be trustworthy, to 
bear the cost of being so and thus contribute to resolving the current crisis of trust. It 
also considers where the state and other social actors have strong reason to protect 
and enforce such moral rights, while acknowledging that other actors have similar 
obligations to be trustworthy. It outlines five ‘salient factors’ that trigger specific rights 
to trustworthiness and a concomitant duty on corporations to be trustworthy: market 
power, subordination (threat and intimidation), the absence of choice, the need to 
preserve systemic trust, and corporate political power which might undermine a state’s 
legitimacy. Absent these factors and corporations do not have a general duty to be 
trustworthy, since a responsible actor in fair market conditions should be able to 
choose between the costs and benefits of dealing with generally trustworthy 
corporations.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since the global financial crisis in 2008, corporations have faced a crisis of trust, with 
growing sentiment against ‘elites and ‘big business’ and a feeling that ‘something ought 
to be done’ to re-establish public regard for corporations. Trust and trust worthiness 
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are deeply morally significant. They provide the ‘glue or lubricant’ that begets 
 reciprocity, decreases risk, secures dignity and respect, and safeguards against the 
 subordination of the powerless to the powerful. However, in deciding how to restore 
trust, it is difficult to determine precisely what should be done, by whom, and who will 
bear the cost, especially if  any action involves a risk to overall market  efficiency and 
corporate profitability.
The paper explores whether corporations have a moral duty to be trustworthy, to 
bear the cost of being so and thus contribute to resolving the current crisis of trust. It 
also considers where the state and other social actors have strong reason to protect 
and enforce such moral rights, while acknowledging that other actors have similar 
obligations to be trustworthy.
The authors outline five ‘salient factors’ that trigger specific rights to trust-
worthiness and a concomitant duty on corporations to be trustworthy: market power, 
subordination (threat and intimidation), the absence of choice, the need to preserve 
systemic trust, and corporate political power which might undermine a state’s 
 legitimacy. Without these factors, corporations do not have a general duty to be trust-
worthy, since a responsible actor in fair market conditions should be able to choose 
between the costs and benefits of dealing with generally trustworthy corporations.
A trustworthy corporation is defined as one with a robust disposition to fulfil its 
commitments to another, providing rational grounds for that other to rely on. A com-
mitment (implicit or explicit) involves an overriding obligation to act or not act. It 
transcends, for example, corporate aims, including profit, and offers accountability 
(remedy, compensation, etc.) if  the obligation is not met.
The author notes that commitments may or may not be enforceable, and not all 
breaches undermine trustworthiness of a corporation, which may breach for reasons 
of self-defence, for example. Corporations might also face conflicting commitments, 
raising the difficult moral question of prioritisation.
Trustworthiness involves reliance, or not adopting contingencies against risk, 
resulting in vulnerability to an unfulfilled commitment. Being worthy of reliance 
means how the corporation is structured, resourced, incentivised, and motivated, and, 
crucially, may be very costly to the corporation. Making commitments that were 
implicit explicit, and allowing others to make your commitments enforceable are two 
ways of demonstrating reliability.
External measures, derived from agents such as the state, professional bodies, 
unions, or consumer groups, may make internal measures more reliable. Reputation, 
which can be enhanced or damaged by other corporations in the same sector, is 
another source of evidence of reliability. Likewise, people may trust systems, groups, 
or societies because of the qualities of one individual.
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The authors note a widespread desire, partly born of legitimate frustration and 
injustice, to ‘take back control’ and restore trust in corporations. That will involve 
both controlling measures, such as regulation, vigilance, and threat or punishment, 
and also measures to instil values, culture, and purpose to corporations, increasing the 
social capital and rewards for trustworthy behaviour and structuring markets in a way 
that avoids a ‘race to the bottom’. To rebuild trust, we must distribute the duties to 
make it happen and the responsibilities to bear its cost.
1 INTRODUCTION
Since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, there has been a broad view that 
corporations are facing a ‘crisis of trust’.1 It is has been ‘one of the main casualties of 
the excesses of capitalism;’2 and ‘taken a battering’.3 According to the Edelman Trust 
Barometer, it remains at a record low.4 This crisis has not merely had direct negative 
economic impacts,5 but is also thought to be contributing to the broader destabilisa-
tion of many political economies, seemingly legitimising populist and reactionary 
 sentiment against ‘elites’ and ‘big business’.6
Given this putative crisis, therefore, there is a feeling that something specifically 
about trust and trustworthiness simply ‘ought to be done’. Indeed, it seems that, if  we 
are to re-design the future of corporations, then we must address the crisis of trust 
with respect to them, or their future might be quite limited.
However, it is one thing to believe that something ought to be done, and another 
to determine what precisely ought to be done, who ought to do it, and who in particu-
lar should bear the cost. After all, acting to resolve some aspects of this crisis of trust 
may be individually—and socially—quite costly. It may compromise profits. It may 
even compromise overall market efficiency.
1 See Parker (2017). The ‘crisis of trust’ has been ongoing since prior to the GFC. See Dennis Thompson 
(2005: 248) for some great headlines, and the ‘need to restore trust’. See also Bishop (2017) and Mayer 
(forthcoming: 7–8).
2 Christine Lagarde says trust has been one the main casualties of excesses of capitalism, and that we need 
a shift toward greater integrity and accountability (Lagarde 2014). Mark Carney says that institutions 
need to take greater responsibility (Carney 2013).
3 Parker (2017: 19).
4 Parker (2017: 19).
5 See Edey (2009) and Moore & Mirzaei (2014).
6 In 2016, the current UK government’s environment secretary Michael Gove infamously stated: 
‘Unelected, unaccountable elites, I’m afraid it’s time to say, “You’re fired: We are going to take back 
 control” ’ (Cooper 2016).
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This essay explores when, if  ever, corporations have a moral duty to be  trustworthy 
(rather than necessarily a legal one); to bear the cost of such trustworthiness; and 
hence to play a part in resolving this crisis. Such a duty will not only reflect when other 
parties have a moral right to deal with trustworthy corporations, but also where the 
state and other social actors have strong reason to protect such rights and enforce 
such a duty through laws and other incentives.7
In focusing upon the moral duty of corporations in particular, to be trustworthy, 
we do not deny that other actors may also have similar obligations to be trustworthy.8 
A fuller account of how to resolve the ‘crisis of trust’ would explore the interactions 
between all of these duties.
This paper argues that corporations do not have a general moral duty to be 
 trustworthy. In other words, it is not true that corporations have a duty to be trust-
worthy merely because others may be vulnerable with respect to them breaching a 
 commitment. In short, this is because a responsible actor in fair market conditions should 
be able to choose between the costs and benefits of dealing with more or less trust-
worthy corporations. However, there are at least five different salient factors that can 
trigger more specific ‘rights to trustworthiness’ and a concomitant duty on corpor ations 
7 Although, this is not to say that other parties might not also have important obligations (that is, in 
resetting legitimate expectations). However, it is the place of governments to solve coordination and 
misinformation problems.
8 As many business leaders have noted in the preparation of this paper, no doubt some of the responsibility 
for distrust lies in unreasonable expectations being placed upon corporations by other actors; attributing 
to them commitments that they cannot reasonably be expected to have. For example, a 2015 KPMG 
report on digital banking observed that customers were now hyper-demanding and had unreasonable 
expectations (Roberts 2015). As such, those actors may hold part of the responsibility to correct 
these expectations. Nor do we deny that such other actors, and corporations may have other duties to 
create and sustain conditions of social trust. It could be argued, however, that the reason why some busi-
ness leaders hold the position that stakeholders should correct their unreasonable expectations, is because 
they are selecting ‘evidence that affirms their own world view’ (Wheatley 2015). In other words, it may be 
that some business leaders believe that stakeholders hold unreasonable expectations of business, because 
those leaders are susceptible to psychological biases, which incline them to place blame elsewhere. But 
note that, while such biases may be a reason why some or even many business leaders hold that view, it 
does not follow that it is untrue that stakeholders sometimes hold unreasonable expectations of business. 
Of course, there will no doubt be murky cases where it is difficult to determine decisively whether a cor-
poration had a commitment to a stakeholder. But, there will also be cases where it is wrong to call what 
the corporation did (or failed to do) an actual betrayal, simply on the basis that the stakeholder felt 
betrayed. If  the corporation never gave any indication it would do what the stakeholder relied on it doing, 
and the corporation could not be expected to recognise—and then forewarn against—reliance upon it, 
then the corporation cannot be held accountable for failing to fulfil that reliance (in other words, we 
could not take it to have an implicit commitment: see below Section 2.1. A type of case where cor-
porations can be held accountable in this way is estoppel cases, which are discussed below (83). In this 
type of case, the corporation is partly responsible for the stakeholder’s reliance upon it, and should have 
recognised and forewarned against it.
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to be trustworthy, along with good reason for state intervention to enforce it.9 These 
five factors are: market power, subordination, the absence of choice, the need to 
 preserve systemic trust, and corporate political power. So, corporations have no 
 general moral duty to be trustworthy to whoever deals with them. But they do have 
specific duties to be trustworthy to different parties, in these five circumstances.
One final introductory note: when writing about trust, it is normal to begin by 
highlighting the central role that trust plays in any form of fruitful human activity (for 
instance, using language). The observation that trust is of fundamental value in our 
lives is no less true of trust in the world of business. Without any degree of trust 
toward (and within) the business world, fruitful exchange is made impossible. 
But in addressing the crisis of trust, it is not enough to just increase trust in the 
corporate world. After all, trust can be misplaced. What is more important than 
 simply increasing trust in the corporate world is increasing well-founded trust. One 
could aim to increase trust in the corporate world for self-interested purposes, on the 
basis that trust in corporations is something instrumentally useful to those who stand 
to gain from it. But this would not address the causes of the distrust, and would just 
prop up an unhealthy system.
Therefore, to properly address the crisis of trust, trustworthiness in the corporate 
world must be increased. But, then, we immediately encounter the question of whose 
shoulders carry this burden, and whether it is the corporation itself  that carries it. We 
must ask whether there are circumstances in which corporations should be held to 
higher standards of trustworthiness than ‘the morals of the marketplace’ would 
 suggest.10 This is why the central goal of this essay is to answer whether corporations 
themselves have moral duties to be trustworthy, rather than to make a case for the 
instrumental or functional value of trust in the world of corporate governance. 
Addressing that concern leaves open the question of who should increase that trust, 
and also leaves open the possibility that any trust in that world is unwise.11
This paper is in four parts. First, it defines trustworthiness in terms of its four key 
components. Secondly, it sets out five distinct values that a right to trustworthiness might 
protect. Thirdly, it contrasts the utilitarian case for increasing trustworthiness with a 
case based on rights, but rejects the idea of a general right to trustworthiness. Finally, it 
lays out five salient factors that do, as exceptions, ground specific rights.
9 These exceptions count as cases where fair (idealised) market conditions do not hold, for various reasons.
10 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this helpful phrasing, which comes from a US Corporate Law 
case: Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). In this case, Justice Cardozo had to decide whether 
a partner/joint venture would be held to ‘the morals of the market place’ or be subject to more stringent 
legal duties.
11 Section 3 considers the moral value of trustworthiness in the business world, in more depth. But, it also 
begins with some of the classic widely repeated statements by key thinkers on the instrumental or functional 
value of trust; namely, that it is essential in enabling human cooperation and morally valuable activity.
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2 WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR A CORPORATION TO BE TRUSTWORTHY?
A corporation is trustworthy, if  and only if  it is worthy of another’s trust. More 
 specifically, in this paper, we shall mean that a corporation is trustworthy, if  and only 
if, it has a robust disposition to fulfil its commitments to another; and provides ratio-
nal grounds to that other to rely upon it to do so.12 In this section, we shall explain 
each component of this definition in turn. First, the meaning of ‘commitment’ and 
what varieties of commitment there are; secondly ‘fulfilment’ and its opposite ‘breach’; 
thirdly, ‘reliance’; fourthly, what might constitute ‘a robust disposition’; and, finally, 
what might constitute ‘rational grounds’ for reliance.
2.1 Commitment
Corporations are trusted and distrusted with respect to their commitments.13 At its 
core, a commitment creates an obligation to another agent to perform some action (or 
refrain from some action). An ‘obligation’ is an overriding reason to act (or not), in 
12 It might be argued that this definition of trustworthiness does not correspond to all uses of the word 
‘trust’. This definition, though, is being used to pick out an important form of trust in the context of 
corporations. So, even if  this is not trust per se, it is the form of trust most relevant to this article. 
On terminology: ‘corporation’ is used for the majority this article. This refers to what ‘company’, 
 ‘business’, ‘firm’, etc. sometimes also refer to. Organisations and institutions are a more general type of 
structured collective entity, to which these belong.
 In philosophy, organisations are often called groups (Fricker 2009, List & Pettit 2011, Mathieson 2006, 
Schmitt 1994, Tollefsen 2006) or sometimes collectives (Collins 2013) or group agents (List & Pettit 
2011). In management, they are referred to as organisations (Kramer 2006). In social sciences more 
broadly, the terminology varies. Sztompka (1998) uses ‘institutions’ to refer to legal, political, public 
sector bodies, and refers to organisations too. In sociology, ‘institution’ and ‘institutional trust’ often 
refer to embedded/established social practices, or conventions (Granovetter 1973, 1985, Möllering 2005, 
Rousseau et al. 1998: 396, Shapiro 1987, Zucker 1986).
13 This article adopts Katherine Hawley’s (2014: 10) ‘commitment’ view of trust and distrust, which says 
that to trust is to rely on someone to meet a commitment, and to distrust is to not rely on them to meet 
a commitment. There are other views on what trusting reliance is (e.g., Baier 1986: 234–5): reliance on 
another’s goodwill; Holton (1994: 66): reliance from a concern for the regard they hold you in; Jones 
(1996: 4): reliance from an attitude of optimism about them). Hawley’s view is most plausible as applied 
to trust in corporations, and also captures when it is appropriate to trust: when a commitment is in place. 
The appropriateness of trust is key for defining trustworthiness. Hollis (1998: 11) and Nickel (2007) give 
similar accounts to Hawley, but they take obligation rather than commitment as central. The commit-
ment view rather than an obligation view is adopted because it helpfully makes clear the distinction 
between the obligations we gain through explicit and implicit means. On whether it is appropriate to 
think of corporations as having commitments: Gilbert (1996, 2006, and 2013) argues that groups can 
make commitments. Fricker (2012) draws on Gilbert’s work to argue that institutional members make 
(initially to one another) commitments to be jointly trustworthy.
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the sense that it overrides other reasons to act in contrary ways.14 Hence, unlike merely 
stating a corporate aspiration, aim, or prediction; a genuine commitment generates a 
reason to act that overrides subsequent countervailing reasons, such as self-interestedly 
maximising profit. In this way, commitments are demanding of  corporations. However, 
their fulfilment can also be rightfully demanded because they must be owed to another 
agent. This means that the other agent can hold the corporation rightfully account-
able if  it does not fulfil the obligations: seeking remedy, compensation, damages, or at 
least an apology.15
However, although all commitments are obligations, not all obligations are 
 commitments. Commitments are obligations which an agent acquires either via 
 consent or the legitimate expectations of others given the circumstances.16
Corporations can have different types of commitments. In particular, they can be 
explicit or implicit; and legally enforceable or legally unenforceable.
First, a corporation acquires an explicit commitment if  it promises or otherwise 
expressly binds itself  to do something. In 2017, for example, Amazon, Twitter, Target, 
and Nike (among others) put their names to a pledge to help reduce American carbon 
emissions by 26 per cent by 2025 (The Economist 2017).17 Corporations can acquire 
implicit commitments due to the roles they take on or function they perform in 
 society.18 For example, Facebook takes on an implicit commitment to protect the 
 privacy of its users, by inviting users to rely on Facebook to safely store data on their 
14 Raz (1975).
15 To be owed something is to have certain normative powers with respect to the duty that another per-
form an action, including the power to release from that duty (see Owens 2006, 2012). For a corporation 
to be obligated in this way allows others to legitimately hold reactive attitudes such as blame and betrayal 
toward it, in case it fails to fulfil the obligation. On the connection between holding agents as morally 
responsible, and holding reactive attitudes toward them, see Darwall (2009), Strawson (1962), and 
Wallace (2006).
16 Hawley (2014: 11) says that commitments can be gained by ‘roles and external circumstances’ and via 
‘mutual expectation and convention’. There is something necessarily willful about commitments, that is 
not necessarily the case with obligations. One can always, at some point in the past, have avoided even an 
implicit commitment, or disclaimed it before it crystallised. Obligations, by contrast, can be mandatory 
and ‘natural’. Hence, for example, we may normally acquire an implicit commitment to follow the law 
(which will also be a moral obligation if  legitimate) in a particular country by acting in a way that invites 
reliance upon that fact. However, we could have disclaimed that we were going to follow the law, perhaps 
even indicating our intention to break it. Regardless of the implications of that, we would not be breaking 
a commitment, and hence would not necessarily be compromising our trustworthiness. Similarly, a mafia 
boss who explicitly disclaims her intention to comply with the law, and acts criminally may theoretically 
still be trustworthy, so long as she lives up to all her commitments (nefarious or otherwise) and avoids 
acquiring other implicit commitments.
17 See also Citigroup’s ‘Our promise to our customers’ (Dinsmore 2014).
18 See footnote 13.
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servers, as a consequence of making use of the platform.19 This illustrates how 
 corporations can give others the right to hold them accountable for certain things, 
without explicitly committing to those things.20
In addition to explicit and implicit commitments, there is a further distinction 
between legally enforceable and legally unenforceable commitments. The distinction 
tells us whether a corporation can be forced to carry out the commitment by law.21
The paradigm of legally enforceable explicit commitment is contract.22 
Unenforceable explicit commitments on the other hand are those the corporation 
avows, but where legal mechanisms will not ensure fulfilment.23 To illustrate: Allied 
Chemical Corporation (ACC) produced a profitable pesticide called Kepone. It con-
tracted with outside producers to supplement supplies. One producer manufactured 
Kepone under terrible working conditions, resulting in serious damage to the health 
of the workers and others in the vicinity. ACC had no legal duty to take responsibility 
for the health of the workers of its subcontractors, so it could not be enforced that 
they do so. Furthermore, ACC initially denied having any moral duty to the health of 
these workers. Later, however, the head of Speciality Chemicals at ACC (Richard 
Wagner) said that ACC would recognise its moral obligation to such workers. ACC 
thereby made an explicit commitment to workers who were beyond its legal commit-
19 Facebook will have had such implicit commitments to protect user privacy, even if  its terms and 
 conditions explicitly stated data would be shared with third parties that could then use it for dubious 
purposes. Corporations cannot absolve these implicit commitments by, for example, putting the burden on 
users of ‘opting out’ of sharing or making opaque how exactly data are shared so putting the burden 
on users to understand, when it can be assumed that being made aware would cause a significant number 
of users to opt out. Recent GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) compliance guidelines have 
made such implicit commitments enforceable.
20 Accounts of how promises obligate can shed light on implicit commitment. Several authors argue that 
promissory obligation is a matter of having invited another’s reliance, or recognised and then not disin-
vited that reliance, on one’s performance of some action (e.g., Friedrich & Southwood 2011, Pink 2009, 
Scanlon 1990, Thomson 1990). To incur promissory obligation, then, does not require an explicit asser-
tion of ‘I promise to x’, because by repeat fulfilment of reliance, where it is reasonable for the other party 
to assume that reliance has been recognised, one incurs the obligation. Black (2004: 274) also suggests 
reliance begins to plausibly ground an obligation to perform an act, once it looks like you have caused 
another to rely on you performing that act. See also page 83 below on the related estoppel legal device.
21 Being legal usually entails being a commitment (explicit but usually implicit). It might not if  a company 
or another agent were to explicitly disavow the law (for example, declaring it to be unjust, or inefficient), 
or where the community for some exceptional reason would not see compliance as expected or required 
(for example, where the state had collapsed or in circumstances that should reasonably justify the belief  
that people are not necessarily committed to the nominal law.)
22 Putting aside the exceptional cases of ‘unenforceable contracts’ (see Richardson 2011).
23 The law could be changed to ensure compliance in future. Sometimes it will in principle be impossible 
to ensure the action is carried out, in cases where breaches of commitment result in irreplaceable losses. 
But penalties may be enforceable.
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ments.24 This case thus reflects the difference between the legal and moral duties a 
corporation may have: ACC had no legal duties to protect the health of subcontracted 
workers, but did recognise a moral duty to protect it.25 It also illustrates the  relationship 
between moral/legal duties and commitments: one can have either form of duty with-
out a corresponding explicitly commitment. But, one will have implicit commitments 
to uphold those duties.
Implicit commitments can also be enforceable or unenforceable. For example, an 
agent may be implicitly committed to comply with local laws, but in practice those 
laws are not enforced. Consider this example from Nigeria. Since the 1950s, 
Ogoniland—the homeland of the ethnic minority Ogoni people of the Niger Delta—
has been targetted for crude oil extraction by a number of oil corporations, including 
the Shell Oil Company. As a result, it has suffered extreme environmental damage as 
a result of decades of indiscriminate petroleum waste dumping. Many have blamed 
the Shell Oil Company for the country’s ills: the environmental degradation of the land 
and waters of Ogoniland, the corruption, and the oppression. Shell and other petrol-
eum corporations are also blamed for the inaction of the Nigerian state, which was 
reluctant to enforce environmental regulations on the foreign petroleum corporations 
operating in the area. Those corporations came to be seen as unaccountable to the 
people. In this case, the Shell Oil Company had commitments to protect the environ-
ment that were in principle legally recognised, but in practice not enforced, due to the 
inaction of successive governments.
Implicit commitments can also be enforceable. Suppose the legal system in the 
Nigerian State were in better health. Then, Shell’s implicit commitment to limit 
 environmental damage would be enforceable.
There are also legal devices to enforce implicit commitments other than just the 
commitment to follow the general law. Estoppel is one such device in common law 
24 The ACC case is found in Thompson (2005: 305). It may have been that ACC had an existing implicit 
commitment to better ensure the safety of workers producing Kepone, because it was their chemical, and 
ACC was aware of the risks involved in manufacture. Thus, it had some responsibility for ensuring its 
production did not cause harm. ACC’s recognition of this implicit commitment was the impetus for 
making the commitment explicit. Had it not made it explicit, though, it would remain as implicit and 
unenforceable.
25 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer who recommended bringing out this point more clearly. An illustra-
tive case to further help draw the contrast between legal and moral obligation is the following. In the late 
1990s, Volkswagen faced mounting class-action cases from Holocaust survivors, who were used as slave 
labour during World War II. But, it denied any legal responsibility for compensating those survivors, 
claiming it was forced to use slave labour by Hitler’s Government. However, VW then set up a $12 million 
fund for these survivors: ‘Hoping to put the conflict and bad publicity behind them, Volkswagen execu-
tives abruptly reversed their policy and acknowledged a “moral responsibility” to survivors of slave 
work.’ VW still did not recognise a legal duty to compensate, but did recognise a moral duty to do so (see 
Andrews 1998, LeBor 1998).
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legal systems.26 Suppose, for example, the property management corporation of an 
office complex is responsible for the belief  of a tenant company that forthcoming rent 
payments will be discounted, due to planned building works. Suppose this is not 
 stipulated in contracts or even in an explicit promise. If  the tenant company proceeds 
to rely on the planned costs from reduced rent, by spending elsewhere, and can 
 demonstrate that there were legitimate grounds for forming this belief  (from the 
 management corporation’s actions), then the property management corporation can 
be estopped from taking the tenant company to court for non-payment of full rent. 
The implicit commitment the management corporation made can be legally enforced.27
These different categories of commitment are relevant to corporate trustworthi-
ness in different ways. It might be that fulfilment of an enforceable commitment 
reveals little about a corporation’s trustworthiness, because the corporation could not 
have done otherwise. On the other hand, fulfilling an unenforceable implicit commit-
ment will indicate a broader trustworthy character: the corporation takes seriously the 
commitments it has, even if  not explicitly stated, and even if  those commitments were 
not going to be enforced.
One final point: whilst we have highlighted the distinction between legally 
 enforceable and unenforceable commitments, we might also make the distinction 
between scenarios where commitments can be enforced without recourse to the law, 
and when not. In particular, a corporation and its leadership can be subject to social 
threats such as protest, campaigns, strikes, reputational degradation, pressure from 
institutional investors (such as BlackRock and Vanguard; corporations that are 
increasingly invested in social issues),28 and social ostracism, which may make a 
non-legal, perhaps even implicit commitment, de facto enforceable. By contrast, if  
corporations or others can prevent such social pressure, perhaps by paying for effect-
ive lobbying and public relations campaigns, or counteracting labour mobilisation, it 
can make such commitments de facto unenforceable.29
2.2 Fulfilment and breach
Depending on the type of commitment, fulfilment might be a specific event: for 
 example, the construction corporation pays the contractor for the work done. It might 
26 On estoppel, see Farber & Matheson (1985).
27 This type of case is discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.
28 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for helpfully drawing our attention to this form of de facto 
enforcement.
29 For example, between 2011 and 2014, US corporation Target released a series of anti-union videos: an 
example of corporate campaigns to undermine unionisation efforts, which appear to have been successful 
in the US (Wang 2014).
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be to uphold an ongoing process: for example, preventing user data from being leaked. 
If  the corporation fails to carry out the specific action that it has committed to, or fails 
in avoiding what it has promised not to do, it breaches commitment. Here different 
kinds of breach are outlined. Breaches can occur from intentional decisions to pursue 
self-interest, or through inconsistency in the activity of the corporation’s agents,30 or 
through having conflicting commitments.
Breaches can be the result of intentional decisions by the corporation’s 
 decision-making body. The cost (including social/reputational) of a breach might be 
deemed ‘worth’ it. For example, when Ford Motors introduced the Pinto to compete 
with the compact cars of rival German and Japanese companies, the president and 
board were fully aware that the model had a faulty fuel tank that often ruptured 
during rear-end impact. With the help of engineers, they did a cost–benefit analysis, 
and decided that the benefit from selling the car to cost-conscious buyers outweighed 
the cost of foreseen legal action.31
Another type of breach occurs due to actions or inactions of the corporation’s 
agents. A defective internal structure can result in the corporation doing things that 
run counter to its commitments, whether or not the management explicitly demand 
this. This can be due to incentive structures being in place that make it rational for 
agents to behave in ways that lead to breaches.32 For example, in the LIBOR scandal, 
several banks breached their commitments to report accurate interbank loan interest 
rates. This did not arise from an intentional management decision. It was due to indi-
vidual rate-setters colluding with traders, who stood to benefit from dishonest rates 
being reported, in return for favours.33 However, whilst no intentional management 
decision was taken to breach such commitments, management did intentionally design 
the system of internal checks that made such dishonesty possible. The structure of 
that system enabled, and arguably encouraged, the corporation’s own agents to act in 
dishonest ways that would also profit the bank.34
30 ‘Agents’ here meaning employees or individual departments.
31 On this basis, Ford launched the Pinto onto the market. However, it was wrong to judge that it was 
‘worth it’ as the decision cost the company forty court cases and hundreds of millions paid in fines 
(Birsch & Fielder 1994). An anonymous reviewer helpfully points out that such a decision may be deemed 
rational on some theories of corporate law (those in the ‘rational choice’ tradition).
32 These are often due to ‘failures of ethical oversight’ (Thompson 2005: 247), which can occur prospect-
ively when able to be anticipated, and retrospectively when failed to be corrected (Thompson 2005: 
251–3).
33 Binham (2013).
34 Alternatively, breaches can be due to simple bad institutional design, with inner over-compartmental-
isation or siloing leading to miscommunications, poor delivery, and so to outward unreliability (see 
Malhotra 2014).
86 Nikolas Kirby, Andrew Kirton and Aisling Crean
Not all breaches of a commitment undermine the trustworthiness of corporations: 
if  the corporation either has a justification or a (fully exculpating) excuse.35 For 
 example, it is generally accepted that self-defence or defence of another, can be a 
 justification for breaking almost any other commitment. By contrast, where one’s 
capacity to make a choice has been compromised by forces beyond one’s responsibility 
(for example, one is drugged), then one may be excused of guilt in breaching a 
 commitment. Natural disasters, new government regulation, wars, and so on, might 
foreseeably ground justifications for corporations to break commitments.36 External 
manipulation, or being the victim of false information, or espionage, could reasonably 
ground excuses for corporations breaking commitments.37
A corporation may sometimes face a conflict of commitments: for example, 
between stakeholders, or between stakeholders and shareholders. As a matter of 
 reality, it will need to break one commitment to meet another. However, such a  conflict 
will rarely amount to an excuse or justification for so breaking a genuine commitment. 
A constitutive part of acquiring and keeping any commitment is to ensure that one 
can and should keep the commitment. In other words, a trustworthy agent not merely 
fulfils her commitments, but always makes sure that her commitments are consistent 
in order to so. An aggrieved party may both admit that a commitment to another 
party takes precedence, but also hold a corporation accountable for allowing the con-
flict in the first place. This still leaves, however, the difficult moral question of which 
commitment should be prioritised, and why, when they do conflict.38
35 Following D’Arcy (1963), we can say that an act (such as breaking a commitment) is justified when the 
agent is morally responsible for it, but it is, in the circumstances, not morally wrong. Breaking a commit-
ment with justification does not corrode your trustworthiness at all. If  the act (again, like breaking a 
commitment) is excused, it is morally wrong, but the agent is not morally responsible for it, and hence not 
guilty, because some special circumstances obtain. An excuse may qualify the corrosion. In other words, 
justifications corrode the moral obligations to fulfil commitments; excuses diminish moral responsibility 
for fulfilling commitments.
36 For example, national security concerns might foreseeably ground justifications for Google to break 
commitments to its users’ privacy. 
37 Consider Facebook. It made commitments to protect the privacy of its users. But in March 2014, it said 
that all of its 2.2 billion users should assume malicious third-party scrapers had compromised their pub-
lic profile information. CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s excuse for the breaking of the commitment to user 
 privacy was that ‘malicious actors’ manipulated ‘Search’ tools on its platform to discover user identities 
and collect the information of 2 billion users around the world (Kumar 2018). A further question arises 
in whether Facebook should have foreseen and taken measures to prevent such actions, but this would 
require more examination of the breach, and whether this could have been reasonably anticipated and 
prevented.
38 We will not venture into this topic (see, for example, Owens (2016) on how it is possible to gain conflict-
ing promises). However, as a general principle, it is unlikely that a corporation has the moral right to 
prioritise commitments to its shareholders over other agents, if  those shareholders are themselves ultim-
ately responsible for the ongoing management of the corporation in the first place. However, this may 
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2.3 Reliance
To rely upon someone is distinct from merely predicting that they will act in a certain 
way. It is distinct in two related key ways.
First, reliance entails vulnerability, where mere prediction does not. This is to say 
that we must have something at stake from another’s action: that is, be in a position of 
potential loss or harm.39 As such, when we rely on a corporation to fulfil a commit-
ment, we must be vulnerable or at risk from harm arising from a breach of its 
commitment.40 
Secondly, when one acts on a prediction, one may adopt a ‘calculative stance’, by 
responding to the mere probability of that prediction being (becoming) true. Thus, 
one might undertake extensive contingency plans, or hedging,41 to mitigate the 
lead to counterintuitive results. In 2016, BlackRock (the world’s largest asset manager) had made 
commitments to its shareholders (in the form of corporate statements, investment warnings, and internal 
policies) that it would use its influence to bring about greater environmentally conscious policies in client 
companies, with the aim of combatting risks posed by climate change. But, it also had commitments to 
the client corporations it invested in. The director of one of BlackRock’s shareholders (Timothy Smith 
of Walden Asset Management) publicly criticised BlackRock’s record of voting ‘no’ on the passing of 
environmental measures at the annual general meetings of its client companies, which it did at the behest 
of its client corporations’ directors. This is a case where the commitments BlackRock had to its clients 
were in tension with the commitments it had made to its own shareholders. Yet, it seems plausible that, 
because the commitments BlackRock had to shareholders were ‘socially conscious’, those commitments 
should have held priority over those it had to the client companies’ boards (see Mooney (2016) and Smith 
(2017) for this example). It is worth noting that since 2016 BlackRock has increasingly made commitments 
to tackling climate risks and supporting sustainable practices through its investment strategy (see 
BlackRock’s Mission Statement on Sustainability 2018, Chasan 2017).
39 It is also for this reason that trust involves supposing that another is competent and willing (see Jones 
1996). Without competence and willingness, a trustee would fail to perform what is trusted of them.
40 Philosophers typically argue that trust involves reliance (Baier 1986, Hawley 2014, Helm 2014, 
Hieronymi 2008, Holton 1994, Jones 1996, Pettit 1995, Walker 2006). Sociologists Lewis and Weigert 
(1985: 971) say trust involves ‘the undertaking of a risky course of action ...’. Robinson (1996: 576) char-
acterises trust as ‘about the likelihood that another’s future actions will be beneficial, favourable, or, at 
least, not detrimental to one’s interests’. A widely cited definition in organisational studies from Rousseau 
et al. (1998) (arrived at via an interdisciplinary literature review) includes risk, claiming that trust involves 
‘the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of 
another’ (1998: 395). Sometimes, though, risk and vulnerability are tied to calculative, predictive expect-
ations. Researchers in the rational choice tradition, such as Dasgupta (1988: 51) and Gambetta (1988: 
217), claim that trust is a probabilistic, calculative expectation of the actions of another, that have a 
bearing on one’s own choice of action, before we can monitor those actions. Coleman (1990: 92) ties the 
extent of trust to the amount of capital risked, in a transaction. But see below on why such views are 
mistaken in tying risk to the calculation itself.
41 D’Cruz (2015: 472) puts hedging in terms of the ‘strategy of insuring oneself  against a loss’, and that 
‘at its core, hedging is a defensive posture in the face of uncertainty, a method of mitigating the severity 
of feared negative outcomes by expending resources to protect oneself  in the event that those obtain.’ 
Hedging is common in finance, with derivatives, swaps, futures, and options being used for hedging. It is
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 possibility of non-performance. However, when one is relying upon another, one acts 
as if performance were certain.42 Reliance requires not adopting contingencies against 
risk. If  you do contingency plan, you are no longer relying.43 Performance becomes an 
assumption in one’s planning.44 Thus, reliance on another’s acting involves risking 
interests, goals, resources, etc. on their action.45 
One may have no choice but to rely. For example, consider the position of Justice 
Obini, a cocoa farmer in Ghana in West Africa.46 Obini’s cocoa beans are highly 
sought after. However, like the 800,000 other families in Ghana, he and his family are 
directly dependent, at least in part, on a living by cocoa farming. Obini struggles to 
take care of his farm and his family of ten. He plans his life and the education of his 
children, on the basis that he will receive a certain price for his beans. While there are 
many actors in the cocoa supply chain, cocoa farmers in West Africa are the most 
vulnerable and least empowered of any of these actors. The farmers say that they are 
powerless with respect to the price they receive for beans, which is strongly influenced 
by Hershey’s, Nestlé, and consumer power in wealthier countries. As Samuel Toribi 
(another farmer) puts it, ‘The manufacturers, the consumers—they control the price 
of our cocoa. The economy decides. So, we depend on them.’47 Justice Obini and 
also a common term in discussions of trust in International Relations. The absence of hedging in 
interactions between states is used as a key indicator of the presence of trust, where trust is opposed to 
 calculative, strategising behaviour. The presence of hedging amounts to a relationship being contaminated 
with distrust, and so not genuinely trusting. Ruzicka and Keating (2015: 17) put it as follows: ‘To have a 
trusting relationship leads states not to hedge against the potentially negative consequences of other’s 
actions because such actions are cognitively considered to be zero within a trusting relationship.’ There is 
an implied connection between one nation recognising the possibility of ‘defection’ by another, and the 
adoption of hedges—that is, the making of contingency plans. So, one nation truly trusting another, leaves 
the former open and vulnerable. Had it hedged, it must not have been trusting. Coleman’s (1990: 92) 
examples of trust as the amount of capital risked also involve no contract, where that could be seen as a 
form of hedging.
42 Williamson (1993: 463, 484) agrees that ‘calculative trust’ is a ‘contradiction in terms’.
43 As Holton puts it, in the example of a drama class ‘trust circle’; ‘when I let myself  fall, and do not put 
out my hand to save myself, I am relying on you to catch me’ (1994: 69).
44 Alonso (2009, 2014), Hawley (2014: 4), and Holton (1994: 65).
45 Baier (1986: 234–5), Black (2004), and Smith (2010); see also Railton (2014). Some trust researchers 
make explicit the connection between vulnerability and reliance. For instance, Hill and O’Hara (2006: 
1724) suggest that, ‘Trust experts all seem to agree that trust is a state of mind that enables its possessor 
to be willing to make herself  vulnerable to another—that is, to rely on another despite a positive risk that 
the other will act in a way that can harm the truster’ (see also McCraw 2015: 4–5). Hawley (2014: 8) sug-
gests that ‘the notions of accepted vulnerability plus foregoing the attempt to reduce such vulnerability 
capture roughly the notion of reliance.’
46 Justice Obini is quoted in NBC News (2014).
47 Samuel Toribi also quoted in NBC News (2014).
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Samuel Toribi plan for important goals in their lives on the basis that large corpor ations 
like Hershey’s and Nestlé will keep prices at a certain level. They are at risk of not 
attaining these goals if  prices drop below that level.
2.4 A robust disposition
A trustworthy corporation is a reliable corporation: that is, one that is worthy of  being 
relied upon to fulfil its commitments. Being worthy of reliance is a matter of having a 
robust disposition to do what others rely on you doing. In the context of corporations 
this is a matter of how the corporation is structured, resourced, incentivised, and 
motivated. Sources of such a robust disposition can be both ‘internal’ and ‘external’.
A corporation may undertake various measures with respect to itself  to ensure 
reliability. Let us call these measures ‘internal’, whether motivated by other ‘external’ 
measures or not. Internal measures may be established routines or processes.48 
Creating these can be costly. They may include creating a particular type of corporate 
culture; adopting certain values;49 and building governance structures that are more 
effective in ensuring that those values are adhered to.50 They may involve proactive 
training and screening, and reactive internal disciplinary regimes, or reward schemes. 
48 Consider an energy supplier who is relied upon by a wide range of different customers; including pri-
vate businesses, public sector institutions, individuals, families, and old people. To reliably provide energy 
to each will require investing in reliable physical and human infrastructure, training of engineers and 
representatives. A customer service advisor must be trained so they can fulfil the reliance of various cus-
tomers. That will be a function of the corporation having invested in good training and customer service 
processes, that are then borne out in the experience of the customer. Part of the proactive features of the 
corporation are such established ongoing routines. Related to this: Child and Möllering (2003) argue, 
using empirical data from corporations based in Hong Kong with offices in China, that building inter- 
organisational trustworthiness requires the establishment of stable, routine policies and procedures. On 
routine-based trust, see also Zaheer (1998) and Zucker et al. (1986). See also footnote 122, on budget 
airline reliability.
49 See, for example, Citigroup’s pledge to customers (footnote 17). On the importance of corporate values, 
see Mayer (2013: 193–4).
50 Mayer (2013: 191–3) outlines how the three oldest UK family-owned corporations value consistency 
and quality, despite not earning as much as competitors. ‘What marks out these and other oldest surviv-
ing independent corporations is the emphasis that they place on product quality and reliability’ (Mayer 
2013: 191). The 2013 KPMG Integrity Survey summarises causes of corporate misconduct reported by 
employees at various different levels and across different industries. The survey highlights the importance 
of internal values, codes of conduct, and how those result in different incentive structures. It states that, 
‘the most commonly-cited driver of [corporate] misconduct continued to be attributed to pressure to do 
“whatever it takes” to meet business goals.’ It also highlights the importance of whether ethics pro-
grammes are in place, whether codes of conduct are taken seriously, and ‘management’s commitment to 
integrity’ (KPMG 2013). These are clear examples of how internal features of the corporation affect 
corporate trustworthiness.
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They may involve stress tests, and risk analysis, seeking the weakest points in the 
corpor ation’s design, to ensure fulfilment of commitments.51 Furthermore, they may 
involve internal auditing, feedback, and review measures that respond to risks or past 
breaches, reforming, correcting, and nudging to improve reliability.52 Finally, as 
 corporations become larger, there will be increasing compartmentalising of actions, 
and delegation of discretion within corporations. This presents a risk to the corpor-
ation, as a whole, of acquiring inconsistent commitments.53 To remedy this, corporations 
must invest in processes to enable crosstalk between different departments, at key 
stages; providing clarity of overall purpose in order to align the exercise of discretion; 
and, in some cases, breaking up and selling off  inconsistent activities.54
The most important point for this paper is that, regardless of which measures may 
be best to increase reliability, they may be very costly to the corporation. And, these 
measures may or may not result in compensating revenue and investment. It will 
depend upon how various markets, and regulators, value such reliability.55 In other 
words, what internal measures a corporation will take to improve its trustworthiness 
will in many cases be a consequence of what external measures are in place: for 
 example, whether certain forms of regulation are valued and reliably enforced.
51 BHP (a mining corporation) invested in internal features to uphold commitments on the company 
charter to preventing employee fatalities; demonstrating reliability and so trustworthiness in respect of 
this commitment. An extensive infrastructure is in place, geared toward ensuring fatalities are prevented. 
Proactive feature: all employees must undergo extensive training surrounding safety; reactive feature: 
alerts about employees in danger in one location will direct human resources in other locations to help 
the employee in danger at any time. In contrast, consider the lack of robust internal measures in the 
automotive parts manufacturer Takata Corporation, resulting in its breaching commitments to safety 
standards. Takata employees in the USA reported concerns about the safety of airbags produced in its 
Japanese plants, but these were not followed up (Spector 2015). Takata could have ensured reliable com-
pliance with commitments to safety by instituting a means of internal reporting to a trust board, to 
 follow up on such reports.
52 See Greenwood and Van Buren (2010: 429–30) on ways in which an organisation can be trustworthy: 
personal, systems, process, and institutional. By contrast, the Libor case reflects a lack of internal con-
trols in the banks’ own reporting procedures. More robust internal accountability procedures would have 
avoided the massive fines imposed on banks, and ensured that the banks’ agents were working toward 
fulfilling legal commitments to accurately report Libor rates. Better ongoing accountability methods 
would be an example of an internal mechanism for increased reliability. Implementation of responsive 
features, such as procedures for whistleblowing, would also have decreased risk of breach.
53 Malhotra (2014) argues trustworthiness of big corporations is undermined by actions being too 
 compartmentalised within corporations, ‘... making it easy for organizational actors to ignore the exter-
nalities and broader consequences of their activities’ (53). He suggests that corporations should devote 
resources to gaining an overview of how the actions of different departments lead to consequences 
beyond those departments.
54 For example, in 2017, the Governor of the Bank of Japan reported that the services sector had under-
taken corporate streamlining in order to avoid passing on labour costs to consumers (White 2017).
55 See Section 3.
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A corporation can be made more reliable with respect to commitments by external 
measures, that will lead to more reliable internal measures.56 Such measures can be 
proactive, in the sense that they act to invigilate, recommend, and/or dictate the 
 corporation’s internal measures. For example, the state may set voluntary or compul-
sory safety standards, and undertake inspections to ensure compliance, or mandatory 
reporting and auditing.57 In terms of reform, one possible ‘proactive’ measure is that 
all parts of a corporation be mandated to create a ‘Stakeholder Impact Report’. As 
Malhotra (2014: 77) puts it: ‘The SIR would consider not just the direct effects of 
actions on all stakeholder groups, but also the effects that the organization and its 
employees have when acting in concert with other economic entities.’ It would assess 
potential impacts, and likelihoods. Then companies could have teams within different 
parts to manage SIRs (77) and, individuals like a Chief Risk Officer (78) tasked with 
overseeing managing and acting on SIRs across teams.58
Alternatively, external measures can be reactive, incentivising internal measures ex 
ante by the threat of punishment or offer of reward ex post. Obviously, the law 
 operates as an external reactive and punitive measure with respect to legally enforce-
able commitments. But, as mentioned above, protest, campaigns, strikes, reputational 
degradation, investor pressure, and social ostracism can also be effective external 
reactive measures. However, rewards can also be effective: for example, financial and 
social recognition (for example, from socially minded institutional investors like 
BlackRock) validating and valorising trustworthy behaviour.
External measures, proactive or reactive, are paradigmatically undertaken by the 
state.59 But, particularly with respect to legally unenforceable commitments, they can 
be instituted by other social actors: guilds, professional bodies, unions, consumer 
groups, invigilating NGOs, and so on. Corporations can also work together to resolve 
their own collective action problems with respect to reliability. For example, corpor-
ations within an industry could create inter-organisational stakeholder impact 
56 For example, it might use what behavioural economists call ‘commitment devices’. On this, see Ariely 
& Wertenbroch (2002), Brocas et al. (2004), and Gharad et al. (2010).
57 Auditing is a proactive external measure that can improve corporate reliability, so long as the auditing 
profession itself  is reliable (see Gustavson & Rothstein 2013).
58 Malhotra (2014: 79–80) also puts forward the suggestion of creating a governmental ‘Stakeholder 
Impact and Vulnerability Board’, whose job is reporting on ‘business, economic and political activities of 
large and/or heavily interconnected firms’ (80) on the impact of their actions, to stakeholders. This infor-
mation could be made public, to enable stakeholders of different kinds to make better choices. An 
 obvious question raised is how costly this would be to run, if  the task of the board was to report on all 
corporations. And, if  not all corporations, it would require some advance knowledge that there are types 
of risks associated with particular types of corporation. But then, the board would have limited efficacy.
59 Often, failures of institutional trustworthiness are a product of excessive trust between malefactors and 
their overseers, either internally or externally (Thompson 2005: 252). Another way of framing this is the 
way personal loyalty can conflict with overall integrity (see Uggla 2013).
92 Nikolas Kirby, Andrew Kirton and Aisling Crean
 assessment panels. The purpose of these would be to reduce the risk of unreliability 
that results not from a single corporation’s actions, but the actions of multiple corpor-
ations in an industry.60 This was the case when the interdependence of multiple banks’ 
activity lead to the LIBOR scandal and financial crisis. Corporations may also sign up 
to systems of accreditation and certification. It could be required that becoming, for 
example, an investment banker should require professional accreditation. Similarly, 
an agreement among companies to ensure that products and transactions meet 
 standards, such as ISO 9000 (a family of standards that stipulate how a company 
should effectively meet stakeholder needs, while adhering to regulatory requirements), 
can be a way of improving reliability.61
Overall, relying on a corporation does not involve contingency planning; a reliable 
corporation saves on practical costs to the other agent. Reliable corporations will 
 reliably perform, and other agents will not have to absorb the costs of unreliability; in 
incurring losses, or in implementing prior contingencies in case of failing. Different 
measures can be taken to increase corporate reliability. However, the question remains 
as to which parties, if  any, ultimately ought to bear the cost of such measures, and this 
frames the fundamental concern of this paper.
2.5 Rational grounds
A trustworthy corporation is one that can be rationally relied upon to fulfil 
 commitments. It is only rational to rely upon a corporation, however, where one has 
good reasons to believe that the corporation is robustly disposed to fulfil its commit-
ments, over a range of possible different salient intervening circumstances. In other 
words, where one has good reason to believe the corporation is reliable.
Based on the previous section, an obvious source of good reasons to believe that 
a corporation is trustworthy will be recognition that there are systems in place to 
ensure reliability. So, we might presume that seeing a corporation meets certification 
standards, for example, will be a source of evidence for trustworthiness. But this may 
depend on the other agent: most customers do not look for certification standards as 
60 Malhotra (2014: 78): To prevent problems like the financial crisis this will ‘need coordinated action 
from firms that are currently co-acting blindly.’
61 Gustavson and Hallström (2013) note the paradox underpinning certification: that it builds trust in an 
industry by implementing a baseline level of mistrust. They also note that, in order to trust the certifica-
tion system, one must hire accredited professionals to perform checks—‘metacertifiers’—though this 
then depends on trust in the accreditation system (101). Walgenbach (2001) argues that, in fact, ISO 9000 
certification standards have not increased trust by customers, but are rather welcomed by companies as 
a means for reducing transaction costs between them.
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evidence of trustworthiness, but other corporations and contractors might.62 
Furthermore, most transactors will not be in a position to see the internal proactive 
and reactive measures that ensure the corporation’s reliability.63 The lines of reporting/
accountability and inner procedures that provide reliability will be hidden. The only 
evidence that transactors can typically have will simply be ongoing fulfilled reliance.
Without a history of interactions with the corporation, another agent will go by 
other sources for evidence of reliability. One of these may be the corporation’s repu-
tation. Reports from others (such as social media reviews) about the reliability of the 
corporation, in respect of its various commitments, will influence the beliefs of pro-
spective transactors. Reputation can also be affected by perceptions of the sector that 
the corporation belongs to. For example, that the banking system is perceived as unre-
liable with respect to commitments, will lead to other agents being wary of individual 
banks.64 An individual bank, even if  it has been reliable in the past, will therefore need 
to do more to be perceived as reliable, against a background of unreliability.65 If  the 
bank in question was participating in activity that led to breaches of commitments, 
then that bank would have to do even more to improve its reputation.66
One way of doing this would be to explicitly avow commitments that were once 
implicit, that the corporation previously breached. For instance, when Richard Wagner 
of ACC avowed a commitment to the health and safety of workers in contractors, the 
act of making this explicit invited others to hold ACC morally accountable for failing 
to do so in future. Making commitments explicit expresses that the corporation takes 
fulfilment seriously.67
62 See Walgenbach (2001).
63 Increasing compartmentalising makes it more difficult for stakeholders to evaluate the trustworthiness 
of a corporation. This could lead to a situation of increasing stakeholder trust, despite more corporate 
untrustworthiness (Malhotra 2014: 53–4). There are situations where evidence of increased compartmen-
talisation without good crosstalk, leads to a perception of unreliability. Consider how the experience 
of being passed around different departments on a customer service line can diminish the perceived 
trustworthiness of the corporation.
64 de Bruin (2015). ‘Systemic’ or generalised trust of an industry is further discussed in Section 5.4.
65 In this way, the actions of other corporations in an industry could in principle lead to costs being 
imposed on individual corporations, which are themselves reliable, in having to do more to indicate 
trustworthiness.
66 A recent relevant case can be found in the reputation of Australia’s main banks, in particular AMP. The 
Australian Royal Commission in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry has inves-
tigated misconduct in the banking sector, and four of the main banks (CBA, Westpac, NAB, ANZ) have 
lost just under 5 per cent share value. The performance of AMP at the hearings, having to answer for 
repeatedly misleading the ASIC (the corporate regulator), has resulted in its share value dropping more 
than 20 per cent. AMP will have to do even more to improve its reputation in light of the widespread 
misconduct in the sector, while also being one of the worst offenders. See Chau (2018) and Letts (2018).
67 Explicit commitment is a way of making clear that you grant others the normative power to hold you 
accountable for failing to act in some way. For instance, Owens’ (2006: 70–1) account of promissory
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Another way of demonstrating reliability can be to voluntarily allow others 
to make your commitments enforceable. For example, a construction corporation can 
make the commitment to pay a contractor on time, but also sign a contract to this 
effect. The construction corporation therefore must be reliable with respect to the 
commitment, because the law can require it to pay.
However, endorsing the use of external measures as evidence of reliability, and so 
trustworthiness, needs qualification. Using devices like contracts can in fact ‘crowd 
out’ trustworthiness.68 This is because it is then not clear whether the corporation itself 
is trustworthy, or just had its hand forced. Had the external measure not been in place, 
the corporation may have not fulfilled the commitment. Also, in the example of a 
construction corporation using a contract to stipulate terms of payment to a contractor, 
this is just as much to enforce the work from the contractor as it is to enforce payment 
from the corporation. The contract can also crowd out the scope for trustworthiness of 
the other agent.
This said, the use of a contract may be a way of gesturing that the corporation 
takes a commitment seriously. If  repeat transactions indicate that the source of fulfil-
ment of the contract is more a result of the internal reliability of the corporation, 
rather than the threat of enforcement, this could arguably indicate trustworthiness to 
the other agent. It indicates that the corporation is built on the basis of values that 
give weight to reliability in meeting its various commitments.
3 WHAT IS THE VALUE OF CORPORATE TRUSTWORTHINESS? 
‘Without fidelity and trust, there can be no human society.’69 
‘Whatever matters to human beings, trust is the atmosphere in which it thrives.’70 
‘Men live upon trust.’71 
‘A complete absence of trust would prevent [one] from even getting up in the morning.’72
obligation explains that, in making a promise (understood here as equivalent to a commitment), one 
grants others the authority to hold you to account for breaches. We have this normative power as a way of 
showing respect for one another: ‘promises are often welcomed because the promisee wants a display 
of respect for their capacity to take decisions in a matter of importance to them’ (72).
68 This is a well-supported conclusion from empirical literature on the effect of contracts in interpersonal 
trust games. See, for example, Bohnet et al. (2001), Malhotra & Murnighan (2002), and Mulder et al. 
(2006). See also Winter (2011) on how performance-based pay for executives can result in a similar 
crowding-out of ‘ethicality’. Related to a point made above in footnote 50; performance-based pay can 
be an incentive that leads to executives doing ‘whatever it takes to increase their earnings, including 
actions that are at the expense of commitments.’
69 Reid (1846: 666).
70 Bok (1978: 31).
71 Locke, letter to Tom, 20 October 1659 (in de Beer 2010: 123).
72 Luhmann (1979: 5).
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Within philosophy, sociology, political science, and economics there is no shortage of 
paeans to the general value of well-founded trust.73 However, most discussion, at least 
with respect to corporations, has simply focused upon one type of value: increasing 
efficiency. In this section, we shall distinguish this type of value from four others 
 relevant to our discussion: decreasing the probability of interference; showing respect; 
validating reciprocity; and safeguarding against subordination.74 We shall also reject 
one putative value: decreasing domination.
3.1 Increasing efficiency
Achieving much that is valuable in society requires agents, including corporations, to 
rely upon one another to meet commitments: whether in contract, in collaboration, or 
simply to obey the general law. Without good grounds to so rely, agents are deterred 
from engaging in such potentially valuable ways, or are motivated to expend further 
resources making themselves less vulnerable to the risk of non-compliance. In other 
words, agents are less likely to engage in valuable collective and coordinated action, 
and/or the transaction costs of such action become higher. Ceteris paribus, without 
well-founded trust between parties, interactions are less efficient.
Thus, the first, and perhaps most prominent value of corporate trustworthiness is 
that it provides the basis for such well-grounded trust in corporations, which in turn 
will be conducive to greater collective and coordinated action with other agents, with 
fewer transaction costs.75 
Numerous statements from regulators reflect how important corporate 
 trustworthiness is for sustaining efficiency in financial markets.76 For example, The 
Wallis Report, which laid the groundwork for Australia’s ‘twin peaks’ regulatory 
model, states that, ‘[f]inancial markets cannot work well unless participants act with 
integrity, to ensure mutual trust, and unless there is adequate disclosure to facilitate 
informed judgments.’77 The Walker Review suggests that trust between major share-
holders and the company create financial resilience and stability. It states that, ‘trust 
73 Such ‘utilitarian’ reasons to favour trustworthiness (that is, because corporations being trustworthy 
best serves the interests of society) are also further discussed in Section 4. The utilitarian case cannot do 
the work of grounding a moral right to corporate trustworthiness.
74 There are at least two other values that are not included: perfectionist—the value of being trustworthy 
as a virtue, essential in particular to integrity—and non-market—that is, in being constitutive of 
non-market values like love, friendship, family, and so on.
75 Trust as a ‘glue’ or ‘lubricant’: Arrow (1974: 23) and Torbisco Casals (2015: 462).
76 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for emphasising this point and helpfully offering references to this 
literature. In addition to those quoted below, see Shipton (2018).
77 Hanratty (1997; §7).
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and understanding [between major investors and the company] … should stand the 
company in good stead in a time of stress.’78
At the level of basic one-on-one interactions, the importance of well-founded 
trust lies in how it increases efficiency by enabling reciprocity. Trust fulfilled in one 
interaction is liable to beget reciprocal behaviour in the next interaction: amplifying 
the instrumental value of any particular instance of trust.79 These dynamics apply in 
one-on-one relationships over time, in groups that have good grounds to trust one 
another, and in society in general.80 Most relevantly for this paper, it has been estab-
lished in relations between corporations and other agents, and amongst corporations 
themselves. Such ‘social capital’, as Fukuyama has argued, is a key element of overall 
economic success.81
3.2 Decreasing risk
Whilst corporate trustworthiness can be instrumentally valuable by increasing the 
efficiency of collective and coordinated action, it is also valuable to the truster in any 
individual interaction. This is because it entails a decrease in risk.
As the old saying goes, ‘a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush’. However, in 
general, one bird in the hand is also worth more than a commitment to be given one 
bird later on.82 The reason is that any commitment involves the risk of non- compliance; 
and as that risk of non-compliance increases, so the value of the commitment 
decreases. This is, of course, reflected in market activity. Holding everything else con-
stant, actors will value more, and be willing to pay more to receive commitments that 
are more likely to be kept, than not.83
78 Walker (2009; §5.26). See also §5.31 and Annexure 4: ‘Transactional leadership fulfils contractual obli-
gations which creates trust and establishes stable relationships with mutual benefits for leader and 
follower.’
79 Trust leads to reciprocity: citizens obey the law, because they expect others to do so too (Lenard 2012). 
This is to highlight the instrumental value of reciprocity, however, as distinct from the normative value. 
(See Sections 3.4 and 5.5.)
80 ‘In large and anonymous political societies, general trust is often regarded as essential to secure general 
law abidance, to reduce the cost of large scale coordination, and to increase the opportunities for fruitful 
cooperation’ (Allard-Tremblay 2015: 377, citing Sztompka 1998: 21–2; cf. also Offe’s model (2000: 42–3)).
81 Fukuyama (1995) and Rothstein (cited in Klitgaard 2015: 24): Corruption undercuts trust. ‘Since social 
trust is an important intrinsic value (personal happiness, optimism about the future) and also has a 
 political value (support for fair institutions, minority rights, tolerance, etc.) and an economic value (its 
positive relation to individual earnings and aggregate economic growth), it may be that dysfunctional 
government institutions are the worst social ill of all’ (Rothstein, 2011: 162). 
82 This point is not universal. Sometimes the risk, and the fulfilment of the commitment are intrinsically 
valuable: creating bonds of loyalty, gift giving, etc.
83 See Section 4.
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Once again holding everything else constant, therefore, trustworthiness increases 
the value of any particular commitment. A more trustworthy actor is less likely to 
renege than an untrustworthy actor. This forms the basis of the judgement that they 
can be relied upon to meet the relevant commitment.
This type of value of trustworthiness of course in part explains the behaviour 
which explains increases in market efficiency. Where there is less risk that a possible 
commitment will be broken, there is more incentive to so commit, and less incentive 
to invest in defences. However, it is important to recognise its independent value. 
There is simply a windfall gain, for example, for an actor who is either, by choice or 
otherwise, party to a corporation’s commitment, and that corporation becomes more 
trustworthy during the course of the relationship. For instance, demand for tickets 
from a monopoly transport provider may be quite inelastic with respect to the reliabil-
ity of the trains running on time. However, the value of the ticket to the consumers 
would increase markedly if  the trains could be relied upon to run on time.
3.3 Showing respect
As discussed above, to make or acquire a commitment to another agent to do 
 something is not simply to predict that one will do that thing, nor even merely to have 
good reason to do that thing (self-interested or otherwise). It is both to owe a duty of 
performing that thing to that other agent, a duty which overrides other competing 
reasons; and it is for that other agent to have a right to demand such performance, 
regardless of our other reasons, and hold us accountable if  we fail to do so.
When any agent, including a corporation, treats a commitment as having this 
 status—not merely when fulfilling it, but also in its consideration, plans, and prepara-
tions before doing so—it manifests an important kind of respect for the other agent. 
It recognises that the other agent is the type of being to whom things can be owed; 
that can rightfully demand that others act in certain ways; and can hold others 
accountable. It recognises this aspect of their agential status. It also recognises its own 
relative agential status: that is, it is not some higher being, or authority that can, at 
will, simply disregard, or overrule the rights of the other agent: like a king, feudal 
lord, or master with respect to her slave.
Corporate trustworthiness, therefore, as a disposition to reliably fulfil one’s 
 commitments to others, is valuable because it can be constitutive of such respect, if it 
is motivated, at least in part, by the duty to fulfil the commitment. By contrast, 
untrustworthiness as a disposition to not reliably fulfil one’s commitments to others is 
a wrong because it manifests disrespect.84 It demonstrates an indifference to the other 
84 Or: being neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy.
98 Nikolas Kirby, Andrew Kirton and Aisling Crean
agent’s agential status, and acting in a way consistent with having a higher status: as if  
there were one set of rules for oneself, and one set of rules for another.85
In this way, the trustworthiness of a corporation is valuable in this sense of  showing 
respect, if  it is motivated, at least in part, by the duty to fulfil its commitment to 
 others. Such reasoning need not be front of mind in any decision by the board, execu-
tive, or surrogates, but it should at least show up if  put to the test, hypothetical or 
otherwise, of asking if and why certain commitments must be kept in the midst of 
countervailing reasons such as self-interest. Respect is shown when the answer is 
something like ‘we must do it because we made a commitment’, ‘because we owe it to 
the other party’, ‘because doing otherwise would just be wrong’, and so on.
This point finds support in an influential report from the FRC (Financial Reporting 
Council), on Corporate Culture and the Role of Boards. This report emphasises the 
value of respect, which is enabled by well-founded and fulfilled trust. Sir Winfried 
Bischoff writes: ‘I also ask investors and other stakeholders to engage constructively 
to build respect and trust, and work with companies to achieve long-term value.’86
However, as we have been at pains to stress above, a corporation can be trustworthy 
regardless of its motivation, so long as it is disposed to reliably fulfil its commit-
ments.87 As such, it may do so in a disrespectful manner, purely from self-interest, or 
for the sake of reputation, or even paternalistic, ideological reasons. Is such a  situation 
valueless in terms of respect?
No. At least, in situations where the state (and/or other actors) within society have 
designed the corporation’s incentive structure in this way (that is, so that the corpor-
ation does fulfil these commitments even if  it is not properly motivated to do so), and 
they have designed the incentives this way because they acknowledge and are seeking 
to enforce the duty that the corporation owes, then the state and/or other actors 
 manifest respect for the agent. In other words, the deployment of reactive or pro-
active, external or internal measures by the state that aim to establish the trust worthiness 
of a corporation, in pursuit of protecting the rightful claims of the other agents it 
interacts with, manifests respect for those agents, even if the corporation itself does not.
3.4 Validating reciprocity
Reciprocity involves responding to another in kind, in part because they have so acted 
with respect to you. For example, I might scratch your back, in part because you have 
85 Or at least where one is willing to demand that other live up to their commitments to you.
86 FRC (2016a: 3). Appealing to stakeholders to be involved too, stresses a point made above (footnote 8): 
that the burden to improve trust may not wholly lie on the side of the corporation itself.
87 This is in accordance with Hawley’s view (2014: 16).
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scratched mine. I might also trust you, in part because you trusted me. This is a fourth 
way in which trustworthiness can be valuable: if, by being trustworthy, I give you good 
grounds to trust me, and I fulfil your trust, then you have a reason to be trustworthy 
with respect to me, and fulfil my trust, and so on, in a virtuous cycle. In the language 
of ‘respect’, if you respect me, then I have an additional reason to respect you. 
Trustworthiness, therefore, is valuable in creating such grounds for virtuous cycles of 
trust and respect. The world of corporate governance is not blind to this point. The 
UK Corporate Governance Code (2016) remarks, for example: ‘But certainly there is 
also scope for an increase in trust which could generate a virtuous upward spiral in 
attitudes to the Code and in its constructive use.’88
However, trustworthiness is also valuable in preventing vicious cycles of distrust 
and disrespect. As Hobbes argues in the Leviathan, if  I have good grounds to believe 
that you are not going to fulfil your commitment to me, then I have a prima facie jus-
tification to withhold performance of any commensurate commitment to you.89 It is 
an act of self-defence against being taken advantage of. Of course, if  such distrust is 
common (as it would be in a Hobbesian state of nature), then almost any commitment 
is likely to corrode. As Seamus Heaney notes, terror is ‘destructive of the trust upon 
which new possibilities would have to be based’.90 Such a situation is instrumentally a 
disaster (inhibiting effective collective and coordinating action). However, it also 
excludes us fulfilling any commitments to realise justice with respect to one another. 
Our very moral fabric is liable to corrode. This is the reasoning that is at play when 
various actors refuse to play ‘their part’ with respect to ameliorating some injustice, 
because they do not trust others to play theirs. In particular, and as discussed below, 
where corporations cannot be trusted by citizens to pay taxes, address manifest injust-
ices, or guarantee public goods, one negative effect is that such citizens, with some 
justification, may start to do the same.91
3.5 Decreasing domination and increasing republican liberty?
Some philosophers argue that there is a further specific harm in merely being vulner-
able to another agent’s power (and which cannot be explained in terms of the harms 
of commitment-breaking set out above: for example, showing disrespect). This harm 
is ‘domination’. These ‘republican’ philosophers argue that domination is the essence 
of being ‘unfree’. And true freedom is to live without domination.92
88 FRC (2016b: 4 [para 6]).
89 Hobbes (1962: 151ff [Ch. XIV.20]).
90 Heaney, (1996).
91 See Section 5.4.
92 Pettit (1997, 2012) and Skinner (1998, 2006).
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More specifically, the republicans hold that we are made less free not by being 
interfered with, or the risk of interference, but by the mere fact that another agent has 
the power to arbitrarily choose to interfere with us, or not. Such a power is ‘arbitrary’ 
in the relevant sense, when it is not controlled in any way by the person who could be 
interfered with (for example, when Ulysses compels his own sailors to tie him to the 
mast). Hence, to illustrate, in the paradigm case—the master–slave relationship—the 
slave is dominated by the master (and hence ‘unfree’), not because the slave is  interfered 
with (the slave may not be interfered with; the master may be lenient or uninterested), 
but because the master has the ever-present power to interfere (whether she happens 
to choose to do so or not) and the slave, of course, does not control the master.93
Whilst initially very plausible and applicable to the substance of this paper, the 
very coherence of ‘republican liberty’ as a unique value, and ‘domination’ as a unique 
harm, not reducible to other values and harms described above, has been under great 
pressure in contemporary political philosophy.94 In order to be unique, the harm of 
domination has to exist, equally strongly, not merely when the risk of interference is 
high, but when it is virtually nil. In other words, one agent is made just as unfree by 
the mere possibility of arbitrary interference, and not made less unfree by the risk of 
interference increasing. This appears to be not only implausible and undesirable but, 
some have argued, impossible to achieve in a society where almost anyone could 
 possibly interfere with anyone else, arbitrarily.
It follows, therefore, and most saliently with respect to this paper, that increasing 
trustworthiness (including corporate trustworthiness) would not decrease such dom-
ination, and increase ‘republican liberty’. By definition, a trust relationship always 
leaves a residual possibility that the trustee may interfere with the truster. Furthermore, 
at least in the cases where trust is based on the internal virtues of the trustee rather 
than on external incentives, it is not clear why this does not remain a form of ‘dom-
ination’ according to the republican definition. After all, the master may be a virtuous 
and trustworthy master, committed to not interfere with her slave, but would this 
make the latter, less free? It is not apparent why it would.95
Given these difficulties, this paper excludes consideration of domination and 
republicanism: first, it is not clear that it properly explains the harm of vulnerability 
93 Historically, many have observed that the slave actually can control the master through the manipula-
tion of the master’s desires through flattery. See, for example, Rousseau’s discussion of this phenomena 
in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755). We leave this complication aside here.
94 Carter (2008), Gaus (2003), Kirby (2016) Kolodny (2014a, 2014b), Kramer (2008), Lang (2012), and 
Simpson, (2017).
95 Pettit has an early essay claiming that trustworthiness does ameliorate domination (Pettit 1998); as well as 
a section in Pettit (1997: 246–7, 261–70). However, neither addresses these concerns, and perhaps not 
 uncoincidentally the value of trustworthiness has entirely disappeared from his later remarks on the topic.
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(or, more specifically vulnerability to the ‘arbitrary power to interfere’); and secondly, 
even if  this were coherent, it is not clear how it could explain the ways in which 
 trustworthiness could ameliorate such harms.
3.6 Safeguarding dignity and the rightful distribution of power from subordination
Arguably, driving the prima facie plausibility of the republican idea of ‘domination’, 
is a phenomenon we might instead call ‘subordination’ for the sake of distinction. By 
subordination, we shall mean where (a) one agent cannot rationally rely upon another 
to keep its commitment, and instead (b) she understands herself  to be vulnerable to 
being coerced into performing an action she would not otherwise be obligated to 
 perform, by the mere threat of the other agent breaching its commitment.96
For example, the majority of the Thai fisheries industry relies on a mostly 
 international migrant workforce, poorly paid and working under highly authoritarian 
and unequal labour relations.97 The worst labour abuses occur on long-haul boats at 
sea for over a month where some 25 per cent of long-haul workers reported that they 
were not working willingly. The most frequently reported means of coercion was 
 economic, through the withholding of wages, but a significant proportion (3 per cent 
overall, and 5 per cent of workers from Myanmar) reported violence and threat of 
violence. There have also been reports of witnessed executions of fellow workers as a 
way of enforcing compliance. 
Such ‘subordination’ is distinct from ‘domination’ in three ways. First, it presupposes 
that the relevant agent under power understands herself  to be in this position, and it 
affects her decision making. Secondly, it does not arise merely from the power to 
 arbitrarily interfere, but from the power to force another to act in a way she would 
otherwise not be obligated to act, by the mere threat of the other agent breaching its 
commitment. In other words, it only arises when the powerful agent can use his ability 
to breach a commitment as a threat. Finally, the reasons that it is harmful are not 
because they inhibit freedom (at least as it is understood by republicans), but because 
it corrodes the dignity of the person under power, and undermines the rightful 
 distribution of power within the society.
Let us look at these two harms in turn.
First, a person’s dignity reflects her moral status as an agent amongst others. It is 
the basis from which she can choose and, most importantly for our purposes, be held 
96 Contrast Kolodny (2014b: 295–6).
97 The information in this paragraph is based on Marschke and Vandergeest (2016). They also report that 
that this situation is enabled, in part, because employers can easily evade regulation given the informal 
nature of recruitment. An anonymous reviewer has helpfully pointed out that modern anti-slavery 
 legislation (e.g., United Nations 2011) is intended to prevent this sort of practice.
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responsible for such choices. Without both the ability to choose, and be held responsible 
for those choices, one’s agency, one’s ‘will’, is compromised.
Mere disrespect by another does not degrade one’s dignity. It is simply a failure to 
respond appropriately to it. It is a failure to recognise the choices and responsibilities 
of another, and what is owed to her as a consequence. By itself, it does not actually 
diminish the responsibility of another.
However, being placed, or even placing oneself  in a position where one cannot be 
held responsible for one’s choices, does degrade one’s dignity. And, this is precisely 
what happens if  one is in a position of subordination. In such a position, one loses 
control over one’s will. Without such control, one cannot be held fully responsible for 
one’s actions. This is demonstrated by the fact that, if  a corporation were to coerce an 
agent to act in a certain way by threatening to break its commitments, then the  relevant 
agent would be excused of responsibility for her subsequent action.98
But notice, such responsibility is also compromised even if  the corporation does 
not exercise that power to so threaten. So long as the corporation can be understood 
to be willing to use such a power if the agent were to act inconsistently with the corpor­
ation’s preferences, then the agent’s choice to do anything will always, at least in part, 
be because the corporation wanted her to do that thing, or at least not other alterna-
tives. One is liable to live in subservience, adapting and compromising to the will of 
the corporation, compromising one’s own individual responsibility, and thus dignity, 
in the process.
Secondly, the flipside of one individual losing power and control in such a  situation 
is also to enlarge the corporation’s. As such, this is an additional wrong arising from 
the situation of subordination. This is a wrong arising not from the harm to the rele-
vant subordinated party, but the illegitimate benefit obtained by the corporation. By 
placing a corporation (or any other agent) in such a position (chosen or not), one 
effectively grants the corporation a power it should by rights not have. The existence 
of this dynamic, in a society, disturbs what can otherwise be assumed to be a just dis-
tribution of power; not just vis-à-vis the immediately subordinated power, but all 
other actors within the society. As such, no one (including a corporation) should be 
party to such a dynamic, whether this is as the subordinated party, or the 
subordinator.
98 The chair of the Federation of Small Businesses (Mike Cherry) recently called for all FTSE 100 com-
panies to acknowledge and tackle widespread ‘supply chain bullying’—where large businesses use the 
disparity of power in business relationships to squeeze their suppliers by, for example, increasingly delay-
ing payments. The collapse of Carillion in January 2018 highlighted how often the government-backed 
‘prompt-payment code’, which committed groups to pay suppliers within a maximum of 60 days, was 
being ignored, with Carillion pushing payments back to 120 days (e.g., Gordon 2018). (The FSB has 
made ongoing calls for this problem to be tackled. (See also Gordon 2014.))
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Furthermore, at least in cases where the commitments are legally recognised and 
otherwise enforceable, the corporation arrogates to itself powers of which the state has 
otherwise sought to divest it. For example, the law may seek to exclude the power of a 
corporation to make employees work longer than certain hours. This may be primarily 
for the employees’ benefit, but in many cases, it may be for safety reasons, or to ensure 
additional employees are hired, or to prevent an unfair competitive advantage, or for 
some other reason. Regardless of the reason, the law has legitimately sought to divest 
the corporation of this power, and may have taken a number of steps to enforce it. 
However, when an employee is placed, or even places herself, in a pos ition where she can 
be coerced by the corporation into acting in this manner, she is effectively granting this 
power back to the corporation. In other words, it undermines the state’s authority, by 
undermining its right to determine the distribution of power within a society.
Engagements between corporations and other agents that involve subordination, 
therefore, are unjust, and should not be permitted. But, how does trustworthiness 
ameliorate such a situation? How does trustworthiness turn a morally volatile  situation 
of subordination into morally inert power difference?
As we have defined subordination, it arises only where another agent cannot 
 rationally rely upon a corporation to keep its commitment, and thus, by definition, 
does not arise where the corporation is trustworthy with respect to such a commit-
ment. But what justifies this definition? After all, an imbalance of power exists even 
when the other agent can rationally rely upon the corporation to keep its commit-
ment, and there is always the risk that the corporation may defeat such expectations, 
or else it would not be a case of ‘reliance’ at all.
The reply is that such power is harmful—compromising dignity and illegitimately 
arrogated—only where the other agent cannot confidently act, with their head held 
high, as if there were no such risk. In such a scenario, the risk should not change her 
decision. It is should not affect the choices that she makes. And this is precisely to 
describe a state of reliance with respect to a commitment: that is, trust.99 As such, if  a 
corporation is trustworthy, then it should make such relations of non-coercive power 
morally inert.
4 A RIGHT TO CORPORATE TRUSTWORTHINESS?
The trustworthiness of corporations, therefore, can be valuable on at least five 
 independent bases: increasing efficiency, decreasing risk, showing respect, validating 
reciprocity, and safeguarding against subordination. However, just because 
99 See Section 2.3.
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 trust worthiness is valuable—to others, or even itself—does not necessarily oblige a 
 corporation to be trustworthy. After all, it has its own legitimate default reasons for 
action, even if  they are not as narrowly construed as maximising shareholder value, 
and these may or may not align with being trustworthy, let alone the costs that must 
be incurred to achieve it.
So, when might a society, nevertheless, rightfully institute public policies to increase 
the trustworthiness of corporations, regardless of the corporation’s default reasons 
for action? In this section, we distinguish between justifying such public policies, on 
the one hand, on utilitarian grounds; and on the other hand, as enforcing a right, held 
by other agents, to deal with such a trustworthy corporation.
4.1 Utilitarian reasons to promote trustworthiness
The first and most obvious reason the state and other actors may have to institute 
policies that increase the trustworthiness of corporations is simply utilitarian. It is the 
claim that policies designed to increase the trustworthiness of corporations—internal 
or external, reactive or proactive—would help maximise levels of well-founded trust, 
and hence overall social utility. Such utilitarian reasoning is not grounded upon any 
assumption that any other actor has a right to deal with a trustworthy corporation, or 
a corresponding duty on a corporation to be trustworthy. Instead, it is simply grounded 
on the assumption that it is the best thing for society overall. 
Such utilitarian reasoning is evident in the legal and economic literature on 
 regulation,100 and in the literature on social capital.101 However, such literature also 
indicates the limits of such reasoning. Whilst well-founded trust, by itself, may almost 
invariably increase overall social utility, the policies needed to increase trustworthi-
ness may not. As already noted above, achieving trustworthiness can be costly for any 
corporation. It may need to establish layers of oversight; comply with laborious 
 regulation; invest in training and culture; and so on. Furthermore, the social costs of 
such compliance are also liable to increase the barriers to entry within any market, 
100 See, for example, Mülbert & Sajnovits (2017) and Stout (2011: 513). Also see Bratton & Wachter (2010: 
656–57, 716): this article refers to the post-global-financial-crisis goal of restoring investor trust as pro-
viding new policy rationales for stronger shareholder rights, and increased pressure for legislative change.
101 Fukuyama (1995: 104) describes the usefulness of trust and trustworthiness in building up social cap-
ital, economic competence, and economic growth, when discussing northern and southern Italy. Despite 
being under the same national regulations, they developed quite differently, which Fukuyama attributes 
to social capital sustained by trust. See Narayan (1999) for further discussion of the usefulness of social 
capital.
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reducing overall competition. In some cases, the market may simply collapse if  
 corporations cannot make a profit whilst complying with regulation.102 
The overall social benefits, therefore, of policies that aim to ensure corporate 
 trustworthiness will not always outweigh their social costs. Ultimately, it will always 
be an empirical question that should be determined on a market-by-market basis. 
It is within this context, therefore, that the particular question of this paper 
becomes so important. This is because, if  other agents have a moral right to deal with 
a trustworthy corporation, then that right may apply regardless of  such a utilitarian 
cost–benefit analysis. This is to say, their right may act like a moral ‘trump’: justifying 
policy action by the state and/or other entities to promote trustworthiness even if  they 
are otherwise socially ‘inefficient’.103 However, does such a right exist? 
4.2 Does mere vulnerability ground a general right to trustworthiness?
As a starting point, one might be drawn to the view that, in fact, a very general right 
to trustworthiness might exist. On this view, if  another agent is merely vulnerable with 
respect to the risk of a corporation failing to fulfil its commitment, then the other 
agent has a right that the corporation be trustworthy with respect to that 
commitment. 
This paper has recounted elsewhere many such examples vis-à-vis consumers, 
 suppliers, investors, employees, and even the state. In truth, almost all of us are some-
what vulnerable to corporations with respect to almost any commitment. This is 
because, despite, in most cases, nominally having the law and other mechanisms at our 
disposal to enforce compliance or demand compensation, for even legally enforceable 
explicit commitments, the transaction costs of engaging such mechanisms are not 
offset by the compensation on offer. In effect, it is impossible to receive full 
compensation. 
If  a corporation is not trustworthy, then any vulnerability in itself  is a harm. First, 
by increasing the risk of breaching a commitment (relative to being trustworthy), the 
corporation will decrease the value of the commitment to the vulnerable agent. 
Secondly, by showing an indifference to fulfilling the commitment because it is owed 
to the vulnerable agent, it shows a certain disrespect to the vulnerable agent. And 
102 An argument along these lines has historically been made concerning the US Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 
2002 (SOX), which was intended to enforce greater accounting accuracy, in the wake of such high-profile 
scandals as Enron. The cost of compliance with the act is high on smaller firms, placing more of a barrier 
to entry into markets (see, e.g., Hanna 2014). Coates and Srinivasan (2014) give a multidisciplinary 
review of the effects of SOX, and estimated compliance cost on firms.
103 There is also a further question of whether sometimes corporations should have a ‘right’ to operate 
free of such policies, even if  it would create social inefficiency: for example, by libertarian reasoning.
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finally, in relevant cases, the vulnerable agent may pre-emptively renege on their own 
reciprocal commitments, or be placed in a position of subordination.
It is tempting, therefore, to directly infer from such harms of vulnerability some 
right to trustworthiness in order to ameliorate them. This is proximate to the position 
put forward by Michelle Greenwood and Harry Van Buren III. As such, they argue 
that:
To the extent that a vulnerable stakeholder group needs to trust in an organisation 
that it will not be exploited [that is, its commitments breached], there is a responsibil-
ity on the organisation to act in a non-opportunistic manner. These voluntary duties 
go beyond a negative promise not to take advantage of the other party; they suggest 
a positive guarantee that the rights and interests of the other party will be included in 
the final outcome. This is consistent with fiduciary duties …104
The problem with this argument, however, is simply the assumption that, just 
because vulnerability to an untrustworthy actor causes harm, therefore the corpora-
tion has the responsibility to ameliorate it, by being trustworthy. But this does not 
follow. Putting cases of subordination aside,105 at least as a general principle: in a 
competitive market, with full information, where individuals can be held responsible 
and bear the cost for their choices to engage with corporations in general, then such 
individuals should be held responsible and bear the costs for engaging with untrust-
worthy corporations in particular. In short, we cannot have any plausible right to deal 
with a trustworthy actor, if  we can be held responsible for choosing to deal with an 
untrustworthy one (or at least one we can neither rationally trust nor distrust). 
This is because, at least under these conditions, the individual has full opportunity 
to ‘cost in’ any harm of vulnerability into their initial bargain. Presumably, she will 
strike a harder bargain with a corporation she cannot trust compared to one who is 
trustworthy. She may be quite prepared to reciprocally renege if  justified. Furthermore, 
at least in such a market, there is the opportunity for corporations to compete over 
trustworthiness, offering alternatives for those who value (and are willing to pay) for 
it. Furthermore, and once again in such idealised conditions, simply preventing agents 
engaging with untrustworthy actors would be Pareto inefficient.
The strongest argument against this position is that, effectively, any such choice 
involves trading ‘respect’ for profit. As argued above, to deal with an untrustworthy 
actor—an actor who is indifferent about their commitments to you—is to be dis-
respected. Are we now arguing that it is just to be so disrespected? No. We are not 
104 Greenwood and Van Buren (2010: 434–5). They ‘do not go as far as to say that trust creates a corres-
ponding ethical duty for the organization.’ However, they do not make clear the distinction between an 
‘ethical’ and a ‘voluntary’ duty.
105 See Section 5.2.
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justifying disrespect. We are merely saying that it is just that the relevant individual 
bear the cost of such disrespect. In part, this is because to do otherwise would dis-
respect the choice of that individual to enter into such an agreement, and to weigh up 
the costs and benefits thereof, for themselves.106
In sum, whilst it is always unjust for the other corporation to actually break a 
commitment (at least without justification or excuse), the fact of vulnerability to such 
injustice itself  is not necessarily unjust. At least in idealised market conditions,107 it is 
a direct and foreseeable consequence of the agent’s own choice, for which they should 
be held consequentially responsible. Any putative right to deal with a trustworthy 
corporation must arise because some other salient factor compromises either their 
choice or the fairness of its trade-offs.
5 SALIENT VULNERABILITY: EXCEPTIONAL FACTORS 
THAT GROUND A RIGHT TO TRUSTWORTHINESS
As a general principle, therefore, vulnerability to a corporation breaching a 
 commitment by itself, even where not fully compensable, is not sufficient to ground a 
‘right to trustworthiness’. Some further factor is required to make it ‘salient’. In this 
section, five such factors are put forward. In many cases, they will overlap, and we 
make no claim that they are exhaustive. However, they are at least five important and 
common factors, which both partially explain the intuitions behind much of our 
 current public policy, and also ground arguments for new public policies.
5.1 Market power
In a competitive market with full information, where individuals can be held 
 responsible for their choices (to invest, consume, lend, supply, or otherwise), a corpor-
ation will not be able to profit from being untrustworthy.108 This is to say that any 
failure to invest in various processes, signals, culture, and mechanisms that would 
106 In part, we are also assuming that such disrespect is not sufficient to undermine the dignity of the other 
agency. See Section 5.2.
107 To clarify: the exceptions we set out are those that hold in non-idealised market conditions. For 
 example, when a multinational wields significant market power (the first exceptional factor discussed 
below), this represents the condition of a non-ideal market; the ideal market has scope for competition 
between providers of goods and services.
108 In other words, it is the case that in theory a corporation should not be able to profit from being 
untrustworthy. In the real world, of course, markets may be uncompetitive, contain information asym-
metries, and have actors that cannot be held responsible for their choices. Thus, untrustworthy behaviour 
can sometimes be profitable, in the real world.
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increase trustworthiness, should be reflected in the market price of its goods, labour, 
or investment. Whilst corporations may appear to profit in any individual case of 
breaking a commitment, the very risk of doing so should be factored into the terms 
upon which it engaged with the relevant other agent in the first place. As such, the 
analysis in the preceding section should hold.
However, where a corporation has market power, a lack of trustworthiness may be 
an indirect way of reaping a market rent. To illustrate, let us take two examples: a 
monopoly with respect to service, and a monopsyny with respect to labour.
First, take the current contracts governing train services within the United 
Kingdom. Each train company is awarded something close to a monopoly with respect 
to a particular route or set of routes. Entirely unregulated, such a monopoly would 
naturally seek to reap rents by setting high prices for train fares. However, these prices 
are regulated by the government. Instead, the only avenue to accrue rents is to cut 
costs, including taking measures that will mean the trains are less reliable. In conse-
quence, whilst train companies make commitments to run the trains on time, they 
have under-invested in the infrastructure to reliably keep those commitments. They 
are untrustworthy organisations in this respect. However, given the natural monopoly 
of the train route, consumers cannot easily turn to any competitor to incentivise either 
cheaper fares or a more reliable service. As such, the train company is able to reap a 
rent from its untrustworthiness.109
Secondly, take a small town that has only one big employer. The employer is close to 
being a monopsyny buyer of labour within the town. People may be able to migrate, but 
the transactions costs are high. We might assume that national regulations set the min-
imum wage of the corporation, and other working conditions. However, similar to the 
train company, the corporation knows that it can breach various commitments to its 
employees without any great fear of losing its workforce. It can take risks and drop pro-
cesses, disregarding the consequences that it might fail to pay wages on time, fail to deliver 
on training and professional development, cut workplace safety, community events, etc. 
As such, insofar as the employer decreases costs and increases profit from such breaches, 
the employer is able to effectively reap a rent from its untrustworthiness.110
Assuming that any market rent is pro tanto unfair to those it adversely effects, 
other agents subject to such market power have a pro tanto moral right either to have 
the rent returned to them (for example, in lower prices, higher returns, or high wages) 
or for it to be invested in improving trustworthiness. Thus, in the former case, train 
109 On the rent-seeking behaviour of UK rail companies, see Wellings (2016). Bowman et al. (2013: 27) 
claim that their behaviour ‘overlaps’ with rent-seeking behaviour.
110 See Taylor (2017: 49–50). De Beers, the diamond producer, is an example. It is the major employer of 
diamond workers in South Africa. It often operates in small towns where it provides the majority of 
employment (Dunning 2005).
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fares should be lowered to eliminate the rent, or they should receive the level of reli-
ability of service consonant with the price of their train fares. In the latter case, wages 
might be raised, but more plausibly the workers have a right to access mechanisms 
that will increase the trustworthiness of the corporation: for example, through 
unionisation.
5.2 Subordination
In Section 3 we indicated that one of the harms that trustworthiness can ameliorate is 
subordination. Furthermore, we indicated that subordination was inherently unjust, 
and thus demanded amelioration, whether by trustworthiness or otherwise. It follows 
that any case of vulnerability that also amounts to subordination, grounds a right to 
trustworthiness (or an alternative ameliorating measure, if  trustworthiness is  otherwise 
inappropriate).
However, prima facie, one might think that the subsequent argument above in 
Section 3 establishing that, in general, vulnerability to corporations breaching a com-
mitment does not necessarily ground a right to trustworthiness, applies a fortiori to 
the particular case of subordination. After all, in an ideal market, where such subor-
dination would be a direct and foreseeable consequence of the agent’s own choice, she 
has the opportunity to ‘price it in’ to her interaction; she can be held consequentially 
responsible for her situation.
This argument founders on two bases.
First, to reiterate, one of the wrongs perpetrated by subordination is not to the 
subordinated party. Instead, as kind of moral ‘negative externality’, it creates an ille-
gitimate distribution of power within society. This, as it were, wrongs the state which 
has the sole authority to determine such a distribution, and/or everyone who has a 
right to a just distribution of power. As such, it does not lie within the right of any 
single agent to choose to create such a situation, regardless of her own preferences.
Secondly, as we noted above, as a general liberal principle, the state does have a 
strong reason to respect the agent’s own free and responsible choices, even if  these 
may lead to her own harm. However, this principle does not extend to the case of 
voluntarily entering into a position of subordination, regardless of the broader dis-
tributive consequences. This is because the very basic justification for this general 
principle is that it preserves an agent’s dignity. However, since subordination necessar-
ily degrades dignity: there is no reason to respect a choice to become 
subordinated.111
111 This logic is seen in many areas of government intervention with choice, whether it be prostitution, 
drug use, slavery, self-harm, or suicide; and, most importantly, where public policy has changed on these
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5.3 The absence of choice and the diminution of responsibility
In our discussion so far, we have assumed that the relevant other agents have chosen 
to engage a corporation, and ceteris paribus can be held responsible for their 
 consequent position. However, for a number of possible agents, this will not be the 
case.112 We can place such agents in three categories: ‘agents with diminished  capacity’, 
‘third parties’, and ‘involuntary stakeholders’.
5.3.1 First case: Diminished capacity
First, sometimes a corporation chooses to engage someone directly, as a party to its 
activities, but who themselves lack the capacity to choose such an engagement, or 
whose capacity is contextually or partially compromised.113
In these cases, the relationship cannot be seen as merely contractual, in the sense 
that each party may seek to maximise their own advantage subject to their commit-
ments (contractual or otherwise). By definition, the agent with sufficiently diminished 
capacity cannot have consented to such a situation, and, without consent, there can-
not be a contract. Instead, these cases are fiduciary: this is to say, that the corporation 
is committed (implicitly or explicitly) to act on behalf  of the incapacitated actor by 
exercising discretion with respect to their legitimate interest.114 
The specific commitment that defines the fiduciary relationship is well recognised 
in law and moral philosophy. What is less well recognised is that, at least in cases 
where one lacks capacity, there is an additional obligation to be trustworthy with 
respect to that commitment. This is because, where the capacity to choose is absent, 
or otherwise compromised, the general reason to disregard the harm of vulnerability, 
argued in Section 3, disappears: such individuals cannot be held responsible for being 
points, debates have focused upon establishing that some of these choices, if  made under the right 
 circumstances, do not diminish responsibility and thus undermine dignity.
112 To clarify the sense of ‘lacking choice’ at issue in this section: this section discusses cases that are 
 similar to the market power cases discussed above. But they are distinct, because they do not imply any-
thing about the market power of the corporation. The stakeholders in question lack choice in whether to 
engage with the corporation, for other reasons.
113 For example, for-profit corporations running retirement villages in Australia and New Zealand are in 
this kind of position with respect to the elderly people in its community suffering from dementia (see 
Petersen et al. 2017). Other candidates might be: children, those who lack full information, perhaps those 
who have been manipulated, and so on. However, someone in poverty does not generally fall into this 
category; neither does someone otherwise suffering background injustice. After all, why should the cor-
poration have to bear the cost of re-distribution, especially when it may not even be a beneficiary of 
injustice? In these situations, choice is not necessarily absent or compromised, although options may be 
limited by background injustice. Instead, choice under poverty will generally fall under exceptions 1 
and/or 2.
114 For example, a trustee exercising discretion to invest a beneficiary’s property; or, a guardian exercising 
discretion in her decision about where to send her ward to school (see Newhouse 2014: 570).
 Do corporations have a duty to be trustworth? 111
engaged with the corporation—in a fiduciary relationship or otherwise—and hence 
they cannot be responsible for being vulnerable to an untrustworthy corporation. By 
contrast, the corporation will have chosen to enter into the relevant relationship.
Most importantly, trustworthiness is required to ensure that fiduciary relation-
ships are respectful. If  a corporation runs nursing homes, then it must not merely try 
to meet its commitments to its residents (and/or compensate them for failing to do so), 
but must invest in reliably meeting those commitments, even at the expense of profit. 
Without such investment it shows an indifference to what it owes to its inhabitants, and 
thus disrespect. Assuming that some, if  not many, such inhabitants have diminished 
capacity, such disrespect cannot be excused as ‘part of the deal’.
5.3.2 Second case: Third parties
Secondly, in almost any situation, a corporation will be surrounded by what we will 
call ‘third parties’: that is, those whom a corporation does not choose to engage 
directly, as a party to its activities, and whose interests are not under the legitimate 
control of the corporation, but who are vulnerable to harm caused by the misuse or 
negligent use of the corporation’s powers in pursuing these activities. For example: the 
Dounreay nuclear plant in Scotland leaked radioactive contamination for over two 
decades between 1963 and 1984. Tens of thousands of radioactive particles from old 
reactors contaminated the shoreline and seabed, thereby harming the interests of a 
third party, the local community.115
Prima facie, despite the ubiquity of third parties, our argument so far might seem 
to suggest that they have a right to deal with trustworthy corporations. Admittedly, by 
definition, there are no specific commitments between the corporations and third par-
ties (or else, they would no longer be third parties). However, corporations can be said 
at least to be implicitly committed to respecting the general system of private rights 
and duties, paradigmatically property rights. This is a commitment we might under-
stand as owed either to the state or to everyone in general. As such, corporations can 
be trustworthy or not, with respect to such commitments, and trusted by third parties 
to do so.
Thus, since third parties do not choose to be vulnerable to corporations breaching 
these commitments, do third parties not have a default right to corporations being 
trustworthy with respect to their interests?
No. It is undoubtedly a harm to a third party to be vulnerable to an untrustworthy 
corporation. However, it is not necessarily unjust. The value of  one’s private rights 
(their pros and cons) is always, partially, a function of  their surrounding  environment: 
its positive and negative features. Assuming these features are ‘costed in’ to the value 
115 See Edwards (2011).
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of the private rights, there is nothing inherently unjust about them. And this logic 
applies just as much to ending up exposed to a risky, disrespectful neighbour as much 
as others negatives. This is not to say that the government might not legislate that 
specific entities or specific activities require a certain added degree of  reliability (for 
example, where the likely breach of  commitment might lead to a grossly  incompensable 
harm: death or severe injury), or that the other party might be bankrupt and unable to 
compensate (for example, third party car insurance), or that the third party is engaging 
in activities that require additional security (for example, a military installation). In 
short, whilst a third party may not have chosen to be vulnerable to a corporation 
 breaching a commitment, putting aside other public policy imperatives, it is still just 
that the third party bear the cost of such vulnerability, since the right to create such 
vulnerabilities and the risk of being so exposed can be assumed to be costed into the 
distributive system in general.
5.3.3 Third case: Involuntary stakeholders
Finally, our analysis of the first two cases, helps us deal with a final category: 
 involuntary ‘stakeholders’. In some situations, an agent who would otherwise be a 
third party, involuntarily becomes what we might call a ‘stakeholder’ with respect to 
the corporation.116 More precisely, the corporation acquires a commitment with 
respect to the interests of the other actor. This may not be a fiduciary relationship in 
the sense that the corporation is required to act on behalf  of the stakeholder and 
 promote its interests without qualification. Instead, it may merely need to take such 
interests into ‘account’, to be ‘weighed’ against other relevant interests in a decision.117
116 Clarkson (1994: 5) discusses involuntary stakeholders. However, he says that they are stakeholders who 
are ‘placed at risk as a result of a firm’s activities’. Without the element of risk, there is no stake (that is, 
there is nothing to be lost). Clarkson intends to use the term ‘risk’ to denote ‘stake’, to narrow the field 
to those with legitimate claims on the firm. In contrast, we want to say that involuntary stakeholders are 
not simply those who are placed at risk by the corporation’s activities; they are those who have also not 
chosen to directly engage with the corporation, and whose interests are nevertheless under the legitimate 
control of the corporation. Our definition is closer to Langtry’s definition (1994: 433) of a stakeholder as 
someone whose well-being the corporation is significantly responsible for, or who holds a moral or legal 
claim on the corporation. See Mitchell et al. (1997) for a tour through the thorny thickets of stakeholder 
theory, and who and what counts.
117 For example, consider the outsourcing of a huge range of local council services in the UK, from 
street-cleaning to waste collection, recycling to maintenance, to corporations like Serco, Capita, and 
Veolia. Elected local councils chose to legally contract out these services to these corporations, so they 
legitimately control the interests of the local communities in these domains. This paper contends that, 
when elected local councils chose to outsource these services to these corporations, the corporations 
acquired commitments with respect to the interests of the local community, and the local community 
became a stakeholder with respect to the corporation. This is not a fiduciary relationship, since the 
 corporations are not required to act on behalf  the local community, and promote its interests without 
qualification. Instead, it may merely need to take its interests into ‘account’ and ‘weigh’ them against
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Applying our analysis above, therefore: involuntary stakeholders lie in an 
 analogous position to those with diminished capacity. There is no reason they should 
bear the cost of vulnerability to an untrustworthy actor, including the disrespect of its 
indifference. The most important difference, however, is that corporations must take 
involuntary stakeholders to be the appropriate authority about what their interests 
are. Unlike many cases of diminished capacity, they are not in a guardianship-style 
situation. As such, any commitment to take their interests into account, and to do so 
trustworthily, also entails a commitment to processes of consultation and deliber-
ation, to ensure that the corporations adopt the stakeholder’s own view of their own 
interests. 
5.4 Preserving systemic or social trust
Until now we have implicitly assumed that the only agent whose trustworthiness is at 
issue is the relevant corporation, and the only trust relation at issue is that between the 
corporation and agents’ vulnerability to it (as if  such trust and trustworthiness were 
 hermetically sealed within particular trust relationships). However, trust is rarely so 
individualised. Often, we (rationally) trust an individual agent, or corporation, on the 
basis of very little evidence specific to their own character; instead, we trust such an 
individual agent or corporation, on the basis of their membership of system or group 
that we trust in general.118 Furthermore, as sociologists have argued, we trust such an 
individual, or groups of individuals, because they operate within a set of social 
 institutions that we trust.119
No corporation is an island. This is recognised by the latest UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2018), which states that, ‘Companies do not exist in isolation. 
Successful and sustainable businesses underpin our economy and society by provid-
ing employment and creating prosperity. To succeed in the long term, directors and 
the companies they lead need to build and maintain successful relationships with a 
other relevant interests in deciding what to do. However, if  other interests were prioritised by the corpor-
ations, or if  they were to fail, the risk to local communities would be high: there would be no waste 
 collection, for example, and that would be a serious health hazard to the local community. See Blair 
(2014) for the view that interests other than the interests of shareholders can be weighed, and sometimes 
prioritised, by the board in making a decision. See also Kaufman & Englander (2005).
118 Researchers call this form of nonspecific group trust ‘generalised’ or ‘social’ trust. For how factors 
such as inequality, diversity, or perceived corruption affect social trust, see Dinesen (2012, 2013), 
Rothstein (2013, 2017), and Uslaner (2002, 2012). Social trust (if  not simply equivalent to) is related to 
‘social capital’, which Sztompka (1998: 20) defines as ‘a bet on the future contingent actions of others’. 
For more on social capital, see Castiglione et al. (2008), Larsen (2013), and Putnam et al. (1993).
119 See footnote 12 for references on sociological research on ‘institutional’ trust.
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wide range of stakeholders.’120 Simply put, the actions of individual corporations have 
wider effects on society. On top of this, though, the actions of one corporation have the 
potential to affect the trust held toward other corporations (perhaps those of  a 
 similar role) or even the corporate world as a whole. Just as no corporation is an 
island in the function it performs, no corporation is an island in how trustworthy it 
appears.
In part, we trust systems, groups, or societies because of the qualities of individual 
members. Hence, the (un)trustworthiness of one individual member of the group, 
whether it be a corporation or a person, will partially determine the rationality of 
(dis)trusting others within the group. As such, the trustworthiness, or not, of any one 
corporation, is liable to affect the trust relations of corporations and other agents 
within the group or system. Does any right or obligation follow from this state of 
affairs?
In general, in a competitive market situation, the answer is ‘no’, even if  a 
 corporation ‘freerides’ for a period of time on generalised trust.
As discussed above, trustworthiness is often costly.121 In a free market, therefore, 
ceteris paribus, corporations should be able to compete over their trustworthiness, 
allowing other agents to choose the appropriate risk/reward payoff they prefer. Hence, 
a market may exist with a degree of generalised trust with respect to certain commit-
ments. However, a gap in the market may exist for a competitor that is less reliable but 
can offer much lower prices. As they enter the market, customers may make similar 
assumptions about their reliability, and hence trustworthiness, as for previous players. 
As such, for a brief  period of time, the new player may even freeride on the basis of 
such trust, bringing in more customers than they might otherwise expect. However, 
predictably, the corporation will ultimately disappoint these expectations, as its true 
level of reliability is revealed. Customers may even feel ‘betrayed’, but so long as the 
corporation did not make a commitment to levels of trustworthiness it could never 
expect to meet, this betrayal is misplaced.
In this situation, the market should properly reveal and price the trustworthiness 
of the new corporation. Now this may impact the generalised trust of other corpor-
ations. However, in this situation, it is up to those corporations to adapt: either to 
 differentiate themselves on the basis of trustworthiness, or to compete with the new 
player on price. 
An example of these dynamics would be the entry of new ‘low-cost’ airlines into 
the European market over the last twenty years. Airlines like Ryanair and EasyJet 
offered cheap flights compared to traditional operators like British Airways, but 
120 FRC (2018: 1).
121 See Section 2.4.
 Do corporations have a duty to be trustworth? 115
also offered a less reliable service. Because customers were in the long term willing to 
bear the risk of unreliability, as long as they paid a reduced cost, a market for these 
airlines developed over time, separate from the traditional airlines, who then took to 
 distinguishing themselves from the low-cost ones by putting a premium on their com-
parative reliability. Each type of airline then came to serve a different market. The 
unreliability of one type did not have to affect the perceived general trustworthiness 
of the other.122
The point is that, in general in a market situation, the existence of generalised 
trust is not some sacred cow that must be protected in the face of new business strat-
egies. If  the existence of a market with great levels of generalised trust is the most 
socially efficient, then ceteris paribus regulators should seek to achieve such a situ-
ation. However, if  left unregulated for such utilitarian reasons, no single competitor 
has a moral responsibility to uphold such generalised trust by unprofitable invest-
ments in reliability. No one has a right to such trustworthiness. Ultimately, one might 
say that in such situations the generalised trust is ultimately poorly founded, as corpor-
ations can be expected to act contrary to such expectations, and there is no obligation 
to preserve poorly founded trust.
Having defined this general principle, there exist two important exceptions. 
First, there can be a right to deal with trustworthy corporations in cases where 
systemic trust is both essential to the market operating, and the existence of that 
 market is of critical importance. For example, systemic trust is very important when 
there is high information asymmetry between corporations and consumers about the 
122 An anonymous reviewer suggests that low-cost airlines, rather than being less reliable than traditional 
ones, are simply ‘no-frills’. In other words, they may get you to your destination on time, but that is all 
that should be expected of them. As such, they are not less reliable than traditional airlines. However, it 
must be emphasised that the question is how reliable low-cost airlines are with respect to meeting their 
various commitments, including their implicit ones. While it is difficult to find peer-reviewed data on this 
point, analysis and commentary surrounding Ryanair’s 2017 cancellation of numerous flights due to 
pilot shortages, highlights the unreliability of budget airlines in comparison to traditional ones, in respect 
of meeting their various implicit and explicit commitments. Remarks from Andrew Charlton (an aviation 
analyst) on Ryanair’s recent problems with a shortage of standby pilots, vividly bring out a point 
 emphasised throughout this paper: that reliability has a price. Budget airlines like Ryanair have a ‘lean 
structure’, meaning they have little room for manoeuvre when hit with problems, as was the case recently 
with its shortage of standby pilots; ‘Ryanair runs an extraordinarily tight ship. When something like this 
happens they haven’t got much of a margin for error’ (Beesley et al. 2017). So, Ryanair lacks the internal 
features (per Section 2.4) that traditional airlines have, that would otherwise enable them to reliably meet 
commitments, even in case of setback. Ryanair’s lack of internal reliability extended to failing to advise 
and compensate customers when their flights were cancelled. The Civil Aviation Authority (the airline 
regulator) was then required to prompt Ryanair to acknowledge its statutory commitments; an example 
of the costs of corporate unreliability being borne by the state (see Lynam 2017, Topham 2017, Treanor 
et al. 2017). Treanor et al. describe the measures that Ryanair took to avoid meeting this commitment, 
with call-centre staff  being instructed to mislead customers. See also Ahluwalia (2017).
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reliability of the relevant product. Left unregulated, the market for more reliable 
goods may collapse, since consumers cannot distinguish them from unreliable goods. 
When the market is for ‘lemons’ (that is, second-hand cars),123 this may be socially 
inefficient, but there is no deep injustice at stake: no moral right to trustworthy 
 second-hand car dealers, nor a duty for the dealers to be trustworthy, enforceable by 
law. However, when the market is for baby milk formula (as per events in China in 
2008),124 then the collapse of the market undermines access to a basic good, which is 
an injustice.125
A similar dynamic arises, not when there is high information asymmetry, but when 
the market for the critical basic good relies upon a high degree of coordination, such 
as in the banking system where the financial product being sold to one consumer 
depends upon the confidence of other consumers.126
In both the information asymmetry and coordination situations, well-founded 
 distrust in one corporation is liable to metastasise into distrust of other corporations, 
which may well become a self-fulfilling belief, as distrust itself  inhibits the ability of 
other corporations to fulfil their commitments, risking systemic collapse. In such mar-
kets, corporations have an obligation to be trustworthy, and to lobby, support, and 
fund structures that prevent such contagion.127 It is unconscionable to seek to profit 
from untrustworthy behaviour in such domains. Instead, corporations should be held 
responsible not merely for so acting, but also for failing to take proactive steps to 
 prevent such behaviour: diagnosing and ameliorating perverse incentives as they arise.
Secondly, untrustworthiness by corporations, or systemic distrust caused by some 
untrustworthy corporations, but growing to encapsulate others, can also potentially 
hollow out the generalised social trust that allows society to function. For example, if  
the corporate world is seen not to pay its fair share of tax, then citizens will be much 
less inclined to pay their taxes. Citizens will generally follow norms of reciprocity: it 
does not make sense to do your bit in paying for social goods if  you perceive that 
 others are not going to do the same. In circumstances where the corporate system is 
seen as being allowed, by the government, to avoid fulfilling its commitments, this will 
generate perceptions of unequal status and institutional corruption. Where public 
institutions are seen to uphold inequality, this negatively impacts on generalised social 
123 See Akerlof (1970). 
124 Orr (2008).
125 Deutsch (1985) provides an account of distributive justice in terms of basic goods.
126 On the contribution of bank runs to the global financial crisis, see Shin (2009) and Ivashina & 
Scharfstein (2010).
127 Thompson argues that, if  compliance with commitments are currently implausible or existentially 
risky, corporations ought to campaign to create systemic measures that make them plausible (Thompson 
2003: 310).
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trust.128 Similarly, when corruption is seen as normal, this makes corrupt behaviour 
more likely.129 As such, where there is a threat of undermining generalised social trust, 
corporations can be obligated to be trustworthy, and to take steps to prevent systemic 
untrustworthiness, for the sake of preserving the social fabric.130
5.5 Political power
Finally, some corporations do not merely accumulate market power or the power to 
harm others, but achieve power to influence aspects of their own regulatory, and 
 political institutions. Such power threatens two distinct possible harms that demand 
amelioration via trustworthiness or other means.
First, and most obviously, where a corporation’s power means it is able to 
 subordinate the state, then the very legitimacy of the state is threatened. To reiterate: 
a relationship of subordination would not arise merely because the corporation might 
breach its commitments and harm the state, or society more generally. Rather, it does 
when (a) the state (through its agents) cannot rationally rely upon the corporations to 
keep a commitment, and (b) the state understands itself  to be vulnerable to being 
coerced into performing an action it would not otherwise be obligated to perform, by 
the mere threat of the other agent breaching its commitment.131
Such subordination clearly disrupts the rightful distribution of power within a 
society, undermines the authority of the state, and at least metaphorically corrodes 
the state’s own ‘dignity’.132
Secondly, however, the power to influence the state, not necessarily amounting to 
subordination, can also be a threat to the state’s legitimacy. This threat arises where 
128 See Charron & Rothstein (2014), Rothstein (2013, 2017), Uslaner (2012), and Section 5.5. 
129 Gustavson & Rothstein (2013: 46).
130 Along these lines, corporations can sometimes be responsible for systematic injustice against members 
of a particular ethnic group or religion, for example, by carrying out actions or endorsing policies that 
systematically favour certain groups at the expense of others. If  this kind of injustice becomes seen as 
permitted by the broader society (if  the justice system fails to prevent it being carried out), then this can 
undermine systemic social trust within that community, leading to the society fracturing. Research sug-
gests that societies that actively pursue egalitarianism have higher levels of generalised social trust. 
Rothstein (2013: 1019, citing De Cremer et al. 2005: 402) concisely summarises the mechanism behind 
this: ‘ “Being treated fairly and respectfully will install among group members a feeling of inclusiveness” 
from which also follows increased social trust.’ (In addition to Rothstein and Uslaner cited above, see 
Trägårdh 2013). Thanks to a reviewer from the British Council for pressing for further elaboration on 
this point.
131 One might think that the power of corporate money in the form of political donations puts American 
political institutions in this position and prevents governments from being responsive to citizens 
(Whitehouse & Stinnett 2017). 
132 See Kantorowicz (1957).
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such power is able to undermine the integrity of the state—its officers and its 
 institutions—most obviously via corruption.133
Corruption arises at the individual level, as the abuse of entrusted power for 
 private gain.134 However, it also arises at the institutional level, as defined by Lawrence 
Lessig:
[W]hen there is a systemic and strategic influence which is legal, or even currently 
ethical, that undermines the institution’s effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose 
or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose, including, to the extent relevant to its 
purpose, weakening either the public’s trust in that institution or the institution’s 
inherent trustworthiness.135
Whilst the details of these definitions are disputed,136 the broader moral point is 
clear. Where anyone, including a corporation, causes an officer or an institution to 
abuse its powers for illegitimate purposes, then it corrodes the trustworthiness and 
legitimacy of such offices and institutions. However, and precisely in respect of our 
immediate point, this also arises where citizens cannot rely upon corporations or 
 public agents not to engage in corruption. This is sufficient to undermine the trust-
worthiness of the public agent, and thus sufficient to corrode their legitimacy. In part, 
this is because the norm of reciprocity is at play: if  citizens cannot rationally rely upon 
public agents to fulfil their public duties (to not be corrupt), then citizens may acquire 
a justification to renege on their duty to obey such public agents (in order to protect 
themselves from being taken advantage of).
Trustworthiness ameliorates both of these ills: it eliminates subordination, and it 
does not only prevent corruption, but the threat of corruption. Even if  public agents 
might be susceptible to corruption, the trustworthiness of corporations would at least 
mean the public would rest assured they will not have corporate partners in crime.
133 Work on the notion of ‘public integrity’, as distinct from corruption, is quite underdeveloped. For this 
reason, we focus here on the case of corruption. However, most of the few authors who have written on 
the topic agree that the integrity of public institutions, and individual public officers, is not simply the 
absence of corruption. Hence, it can be undermined by corrupt power in non-corrupt ways. Furthermore, 
insofar as one accepts the further claim that undermining any element of public integrity (not just via 
corruption) threatens public legitimacy, then the argument applied below with respect to corruption, 
applies more generally. See Brock (2014), Hardi et al. (2015), Heywood & Rose (2015), Heywood et al. 
(2017), Huberts (2014), Kirby (2018), Montefiore & Vines (1999), and Philp (2007).
134 Pope (1997), Transparency International (2018), and Mungiu-Pippidi (2015: 3).
135 Lessig, (2013: 553).
136 See Philp (1997) and Amit et al. (2017).
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6 CONCLUSION
Trust is good, but control is better.
 Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924)
As political constituencies around the globe react to the ‘crisis of trust’—not just with 
respect to corporations, but also government, the media, and elites—there is a tem-
ptation to agree with Lenin’s claim. There is a desire, in no large part born of legitimate 
frustration and injustice, not merely to reform but to ‘take back control’. However, as 
argued in this essay, at least with respect to corporations, well-founded trust is incred-
ibly valuable: it allows the social efficiency of capitalism, decreases its risks, allows for 
respect, validates reciprocity, and safeguards dignity and the rightful distribution of 
power against subordination. Yes, some measures to achieve trustworthiness in corpor-
ations, at least as we have defined it, are somewhat ‘controlling’, and will require 
 regulation, vigilance, and threats of punishment. However, many measures are not: 
instilling values, culture, and purpose to corporations; increasing the social capital 
and rewards of trustworthy behaviour; structuring markets in a way that avoids ‘races 
to the bottom’ with respect to breaching commitments; ensuring that appropriate 
information about a corporation’s reliability is available to vulnerable agents.
If  our only reaction to this crisis of trust is a programme of control, then we would 
lose much of the value that such trustworthiness can create, but which is out of the 
reach of purely coercive, controlling regimes.
As we have argued, however, building well-founded trust is costly. It is not enough 
to simply laud such trust’s value. We must also distribute the duties to make it happen, 
and the responsibilities to bear its cost. This paper has only sought to explore one 
aspect of that set of duties and responsibilities: the duty of corporations themselves 
to be trustworthy, and bear the costs of such trustworthiness. It has rejected the idea 
that there is any general duty to be trustworthy, but set out five distinct cases where 
particular duties arise: market power, subordination, the absence of choice, the pres-
ervation of systemic trust, and political power. Perhaps if  corporations take up these 
duties, whether by their own volition or by external encouragement, then we might see 
that trust is good, control is better, trustworthiness is best.
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